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PREFACE
This report is a publication from Consumer Trust in Food. A European Study of the Social and Institutional
Conditions for the Production of Trust. The TRUSTINFOOD project (2002-2004) is supported by the European
Commission, Quality of Life and management of Living Resources Programme (QoL), Key Action 1 Food,
Nutrition and Health (contract no. QLK1-CT-2001-00291). Unni Kjærnes at The National Institute for Consumer
Research (SIFO) is responsible for coordinating the project. 
On the basis of individual and institutional data, the study seeks to identify and analyse factors that determine
trust in the food supply and in information sources. These factors include the roles of public authorities,
consumer organisations, market actors, consumers, NGOs, etc. Representative surveys have been conducted in
six countries, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, and Portugal. Institutional studies have been
carried out in the same countries and at the European level. By eventually bringing all these data together, we
expect to achieve a systematic analysis of the institutional bases of consumer trust and distrust in food provision
under varying conditions in contemporary Europe, including a critical analysis of alternative strategies for
handling trust and distrust in the food system. More information and new publications are available on the
project website: www.trustinfood.org. 
This report presents data and analyses from studies at the European Union level. It belongs to a series of reports
from each of the six countries and one concerning the European level. This report can be read independently. But
together, the reports are also meant to provide a basis for the comparative institutional analyses. The research
questions as well as the design and methodologies in these institutional studies have been closely coordinated
throughout the process of data collection, analysis and writing. Responsible for this coordination have been the
Danish partners: Lotte Holm at the Research Department for Human Nutrition, Royal Veterinary and
Agricultural University (KVL) in Copenhagen and Bente Halkier at the Department of Communication,
Roskilde University Centre (RUC). The EU level report was placed under the responsibility of the UK partners :
Alan Warde and Mark Harvey, Centre for Research on Innovation and Competition  (CRIC) at the University of
Manchester. The various country teams in the TRUSTINFOOD project have contributed with long and intense
discussions during a series of project meetings. In the final round, the full report drafts have been reviewed by
Lotte Holm and Unni Kjærnes. It must be emphasised, however, that the authors take full responsibility for the
contents of this report.
We wish to thank all informants for their collaboration, stressing that while quoted extracts come from the
interviews that they have kindly given us, we as authors are solely responsible for the interpretation and the
overall structure of the argument in this country report.
Manchester, July, 2004 
Centre for Research on Innovation and Competition,  
The University of Manchester, 
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1 Executive Summary
1.1 Objectives
· The report aims to analyse the developing institutional basis at the European level for the Trust in
Food, involving the construction and redefinition of the European ‘consumer’ and ‘consumer
interest’, in relation to the organisations and interests involved in food provisioning.
· Based on a view of trust as a relationship between parties, the report aims to analyse the changing
distribution of responsibilities between parties as represented at a European level for five key food
issues: safety, nutrition, quality, value and ethics.
· The report aims to analyse changes in regulatory policies in relation to food provisioning,
particularly following the BSE episode, as a key indicator of institutional change at the European
level.
1.2 Study methods
The main study methods for the report were:
· The construction of a framework for comparative institutional analysis co-ordinated with the six
national studies.
· A portfolio of 20 interviews with key strategic actors involved in food policy at the European level
(See Appendix A for list). In depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted.
· The documentary analysis of step-by-step decision making processes, and the process of adoption
of key debates prior to adoption of a selection of relevant and significant Commission proposals.
1.3 Main findings
The main findings of the report can be summarised under four heads: the emergence of a European
food policy and European ‘consumer’ (Section 2); the changing institutional balance between the
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament in response to the BSE crisis (Section 3); the
institutional division of responsibility, including the attribution of responsibility to consumers (Section
4); and the institutional differentiation between the five key food issues (Section 5).
· Prior to the emergence at the European level of the BSE crisis in 1997, there had been a process of
Europeanisation of food policy as well as a development of a consumer policy, driven primarily by
the logic of market integration and efficiency (2.1, 2.2).
· Following the BSE crisis a major re-alignment of powers between the Commission, Council and
Parliament in relation to food gave the latter critical influence through co-decision making. This
change, rather than consumer organisation influence at the European level, gave new prominence
to consumers as a primary concern of food policy (Section 3).
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· A major institutional change occurred, putting consumer interests on a new basis, occurred with
the establishment of DG SANGCO and the European Food Safety Authority (Section 4.1, 4.2).
· A new institutional differentiation developed between policy and regulation based mandatory EU
and national mutual recognition emerged at the European level, with food safety as the domain of
mandatory European level, regulation (4.1, 4.2).
· The new institutional structures resulted in continuing tension between health, safety, and
nutritional issues, involving the creation of responsibilities and risks distinguishing consumer and
citizen (5.1), with the former endowed with individual choice and responsibility, the latter with
rights and obligations (5.1)
· The development of European level regulation on labelling, based on concepts of the informed
consumer, and attributing responsibility to consumers for making informed choices, has been a
development of central importance in creating a new European-level institutional condition of
trust. The label regulation of nutritional claims is exemplary in this regard (5.1).
· The construction of European-level institutions surrounding quality, notably in relation to
denominations of origin and geographical designation, have demonstrated the strengths and limits
of European regulation of quality in a market setting, creating new relationships of trust in quality.
The construction of ‘organic’ quality at a European level regulation is exemplary of a need to set
market standards within a Single European Market (5.2).
· A new process, paralleled in country studies, of redefining the relationship between public and
private sector responsibilities has emerged with the development especially of integrated retailer
supply chains, with the promotion of HACCP through European directives (5.4)
· The development of food policies focused around a European ‘institutional consumer’ as framed
and protected by European regulation has created new tensions with global food regulatory
systems, and the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) treaty agreements (5.5).
1.4 Conclusions
· A major restructuring of institutional and regulatory frameworks at the European level has created
new conditions and bases of trust (and distrust) in food.
· The ‘consumer’ has emerged at as a significant figure in European regulation, discourse and
institutional arrangements over the past two decades, justifying the concept of an
‘institutionalisation of a European consumer and citizen’ in relation to food provision.
· The five dimensions of trust in food (safety, nutrition, quality, value, and ethics) have found new
institutional expression at the European level, partly in response to food crises, partly in response
to the development of food provisioning systems.
· There are continuing tensions and grounds for further institutional change in relation to conditions
for trust in food, notably around the issues of nutrition and health, novel foods, and divergences
between European and WTO regulatory frameworks.
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2 Introduction
2.1 The overall TIF project
As a contribution to the TIF project1, this report describes and analyses changes in the supranational
and trans-national regulation of food issues, with a particular focus on the development and
implementation of EU-standards and policies. It aims to chart the changes in public regulatory policies
at the Community level, to describe the changing divisions of responsibilities on the main key food
issues (quality, nutrition, safety, value for money and ethics) identified in WP5. It follows on from and
completes the synchronic mapping of the European Union (EU) institutional framework of the food
sector already delivered under WP4.
2.2 Food issues and EU institutions: overall presentation
Today, almost all aspects of foodstuffs marketed in the EU countries are defined, controlled and
regulated by national and supra-national regulations and standards. In particular, since the creation of
the Single Market, the growing regulatory power of the EU has affected more and more important
parts of the production, control, distribution, circulation, packaging and presentation, and also social
judgments and scientific expertise concerning food. The “social conditions for the production of
consumer trust in food”2 need to be studied with regard to the recent development of forces that aim to
“harmonise” the European Food market in order to facilitate cross-border and extra-European
exchanges,   and with regard to the opposing forces which seek to prevent “harmonisation” becoming
“homogenisation”. The EU essentially produces food regulations aimed at an approximation of
member states’ food laws. These are the result of incessant negotiations between the main three
entities that are directly involved in the regulation, decision-making and implementation of EU law,
and the various lobby groups which interact with them more or less formally.
Let us first of all recall briefly the main functions of the three EU institutions referred to. The
European Commission (EC) is composed of several Directorates General (DGs). It has legislative
initiative, writing “proposals” to be rejected, amended or adopted at the end of the legislation-making
process. The EC also represents the EU in international trade negotiations. The Council of the EU is a
legislative body having voice on all decision procedures. It represents the interests of the Member
States and has power to conclude international agreements on behalf of the European Communities.
The European Parliament (EP), directly elected by EU citizens, shares a co-legislative power with the
Council. It considers the Commission's proposals and is associated with the Council in three different
decision procedures in the legislative process.  Parliament and Council share budgetary powers. These
three institutions are distributed between Strasbourg, Luxembourg and (predominantly) in Brussels.
They are surrounded by “interest” and “non-interest” groups which exercise intense lobbying
activities. One estimate  that there are approximately 3,000 special interest groups in Brussels,
                                                
1 Consumer Trust in Food. A European Study of the Social and Institutional Conditions for the Production of
Trust, 12 March 2001, ‘Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources.’ Work Programme 2001. Key
Action 1: Food; nutrition and health
2 Title of the overall TIF project
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consisting of 10,000 individuals working in the lobbying sector3. The dialogue between the
Commission and the interest groups takes three forms: by establishing advisory committees, by
informal contacts with interest groups on an ad hoc basis or by publishing consultation document such
as “Green papers” on the Internet and sent to civil society actors for reaction.
The EU is notably the world's largest producer of food and drinks. The food and drink industry ranks
alongside the automobile sector as a leading industrial sector in the EU, with an annual production of
around €600 billion and employing over 2.6 million people 4. The EU food industry is becoming very
concentrated: on average the five firm concentration ratio is 30% with increasing importance of the
world’s largest food multinationals such as Unilever, Nestlé, Philip Morris and Danone. The food
retail sector selling to final consumers is undertaking the most dynamic processes of concentration
recently observed. About fifty firms account for half of the entire turnover of the EU food retail sector;
the top 20 firms account for 40% of total activity.
2.3 Localisation of and access to sources
The analysis presented here is the result of 18 months of collection, analysis, comparison of data
collected by systematic investigation of EU related documents on food safety, quality, and nutrition, in
addition to interviews of 20 persons, mainly in Brussels.
In contrast to some member countries that were studied simultaneously in the frame of the TIF project,
access to writing and oral sources has been relatively easy at the EU level. The amount of official
information made publicly available by the EU institutions on the Internet can be qualified as
“colossal”. For written sources, the whole body of European Union law (Official Journal, Treaties,
Legislation or legislation in preparation, Case-Law, Parliamentary questions to the Commission etc.)
is published in all the official languages in the EUR-Lex website. The sites PreLex (Commission) and
Œil (Parliament) provide information that permit one to follow step-by-step the stages of the decision-
making process between the EU institutions. They allow one to follow the content of the debates
between the institutions preceding the adoption of a Commission proposal. The RAPID database
contains all press releases (since 1985) of all the Commission DGs as soon as they are made public.
Each DG manages a website in which are published speeches of the DG, newsletters, reports and
consultations. DG SANCO’s website is among the most comprehensive, in coherence with its policy
of “transparency”. As issues are often transversally treated by more than one DG, another possibility
for researchers to get issue-related information is to consult the website SCAD which provides the
main legislative measures and procedures around a selected but still great number of key-topics and
provides links to official texts and DG websites. The latest public events such as parliamentary
sessions are also made available on the Internet in real-time for any home computer. Other debates are
video-recorded on a case by case basis (such as the EFSA meeting) and made publicly available. As
shown by these examples, the problem is rarely coming from a lack of information as it is abundant
and technically reliable. The problem comes rather from the choice, the weighting and ranking of
information that is sometimes reproduced many times. In order to build a sample of speeches, white
                                                
3 Source : Secretariat General European Commission
4 Source : White Paper on Food Safety COM(1999) 719 final
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and green papers, committee reports, from EUROPA (European Commission Website) and
EUROPARL (European Parliament website) , we used search engines (site specific and those such as
Google). Therefore, our main working material was the result of a systematic search by “key food
issues” (or their related meaning) identified as  “nutrition”, “quality”, “safety”, “animal welfare” (for
ethics), “Genetically Modified Organisms” (GMO), “novel food” etc. The same search engines have
been used to select among the position papers and the press release documents published on their
websites by the NGO’s, consumer organisations and interest groups that we interviewed.  As planned
in the initial project, we also realised a total of 20 interviews5, mainly in Brussels. All the
organisations and DGs have been relatively easy to contact and despite heavy agendas in the hectic
Brussels European quarter, they accepted to be interviewed for approximately an hour.
Figure 1 Localisation of interviewees in Brussels
To summarise the content of the interview guide: each interviewee was asked what was for them “the
most important food issue for consumers” at the time of the interview, and to what extent the
interviewee, within their organisation, was concerned by this issue in terms of responsibilities and
actions. Whenever possible, the five key-food issues identified in the overall TIF project (quality,
                                                
5 In details among the interest and non-interest groups:
- Two consumer organisations (BEUC, EUROCOOP)
- Two NGO’s (EEB, EPHA)
- Three representatives of the food industry and retailers (CIAA, Eurocommerce, EUFIC)
- Two representatives of the agricultural sector (COPA-COGECA, CPE)
- Eurogroup for Animal Welfare.
- In DG SANCO, interviews of four persons, one adviser on Consumer Information, one  responsible
for biological risks  (BSE in particular), one responsible for Health Monitoring and prevention, one
responsible for EU Food law and relations between SANCO and EFSA.
- In DG AGRI, three persons have been interviewed: one responsible for beef regulation, one for
markets in crop products (tomatoes notably), one responsible for quality policy of agriculture
products.
- One person responsible for SPS agreement, Hormone Beef and GMOs in international relation has
been interview at DG TRADE.
- Two British academic personalities have been interviewed in London for their knowledge on
respectively food policy issues and nutrition issues.
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nutrition, safety, value for money, ethics) were reviewed with the interviewee following
approximately the same pattern as the first question.
The interviews carried out have demonstrated that all our interlocutors had a high degree of skill in
managing public relationships and that they were always well prepared to intervene in any public
discourse to expose and defend the position of their group or DG in the latest developments. The great
majority of civil servants seemed to have a very good knowledge of their files, but limited general
vision of the problems and a relatively short memory for the past events. This can be explained in
some cases by a “limitation of responsibility” for affairs they have no direct responsibilities for and by
a high degree of rotation between positions (change of responsibilities after three or four years). Also,
since September 2000 a “code of good administrative behaviour6” regulates public relations between
Commission staff and citizens, how to behave with and provide answers to the thousands of
consultants, lobbies, journalists or researchers they deal with in Brussels 7. Memory, the ability to talk
about the past, is a rather precious commodity among the lobby or non policy-maker groups as such
longevity can bring a certain legitimacy. This is particularly attractive for the Commission’s staff who
precisely lack of this resource.
 Despite the high technical content of certain food issues, almost all the persons interviewed among
lobby groups were aware of the latest developments in EU food regulations regarding food safety,
nutrition, labelling, claims, EFSA etc. The degree of knowledge can be qualified as “high” in relation
to that produced by the Brussels institutions and medium in relation to the other lobby groups position.
It is not surprising when considering that most of our interviewees belong to interest groups regularly
consulted, formally or informally, by the Commission services. They are solicited at an early stage of
the legislation making process and are required to deliver an official position paper in sometimes only
a few days. On the other hand, when reporting consumer opinions, they were rarely able to mention
their sources. Often, consumer opinions were supported by personalised examples taken in the close
environment of the interviewee (particularly true for quality and nutrition matters).
In introducing the term “consumer” in our interview guide, we are aware that we introduced bias in the
answers. With very few exceptions, the expression “consumer” was largely taken for granted and
rarely submitted to criticism. The very high degree of homogeneity in the discourse and expressions
used by Commission staff, stakeholders, consumer organisations and NGOs was also remarkable. This
is the result of a combination of factors. They are all regular interlocutors of each other, their offices
are located within a small area of the European quarter of Brussels, they are invited to the same
numerous meetings 8, using almost exclusively one unique language in their writing and oral
exchanges, sharing for some of them the same shopping place or sporting activities. With the
exception of a French civil servant who recently retired, those interviews conducted in French with
native French speakers were filled with English expressions as if the economy of language in this
particular context dictated the use of this “EU English” for greater efficiency. This probably cannot be
generalised to all issues treated in Brussels, but for food policy and consumer policy it seemed to be
                                                
6 Officially, “the Code lays down the principles on which relations between the Commission and the public
should be based: lawfulness, non- discrimination, proportionality of measures to the aim pursued, and
consistency in administrative behaviour”
7 “Staff replying to enquiries shall provide information on subjects for which they have direct responsibility and
should direct the caller to the specific appropriate source in other cases. If necessary, they should refer callers to
their superior or consult him or her before giving the information”
8 Meeting organised by the Parliament, the Commission or the lobby groups and NGOs.
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the case. Both issues have developed recently and unlike the agriculture domain, for instance, have
been less influenced by the foundation countries such as Germany and France and more by the UK,
where consumer issues are a well developed theme in academic as well as in political spheres.
2.4 Presentation of the report
The year 1997 became an important turning point in EU food policy by bringing the consumer to the
fore. A few months after the emotion provoked by the British Ministry of Agriculture announcement
of the existence of a link between BSE and a new variant of CJD, the Medina parliamentary
committee published a report on the “maladministration” in the implementation of Community law in
relation to BSE9. The Commission responded quickly by the publication of a Commission document
that promised a “new departure”, a complete reorganisation that intended to place “consumer
protection” at the core of a new EU integrated food system headed  by a new European Food
Authority. The ultimate objectives were to better protect consumer health and “restore” consumer
“confidence”. It was proclaimed, with a certain emphasis, that the market will not have prevalence
over consumer interests. Although this opposition between market and consumer was not an unknown
political theme, in particular since the 1970s, this was the first time it was officially and unanimously
recognised by all EU institutions as a potential tension that needed to be regulated.
What are the effects of this turn in today’s EU food policy? To answer this question, it is necessary
first of all to place this “new departure” in the context of that which preceded it. This will be the aim
of our first part in which we will describe briefly the circumstances of the development of an EU food
policy and an EU consumer policy.
By approaching the new food policy by key-issues such as quality, safety and nutrition, our second
part will show great contrasts between what was announced in the “New departure” programme and
the effective repartition of responsibilities that has followed. The somewhat opportunistic introduction
of an ill-defined concept of “consumer” in a food policy which used to deal with “consumption” has
led to tensions that are still reflected in the division of responsibilities. The EU institutionalised
consumer has many facets that reflect the still fragmented EU food system.
3 EU food single market and EU consumer policy
We start by answering basic questions: Why and how the European Community had to intervene in
national food regulation? How did the EU go from a market-led food regulation system to a more
integrated EU food policy addressing consumer safety? Indeed, the BSE crisis gave a decisive
impulsion to the “new departure” for an EU food policy. But it would not have had such an impact
without the changes that occurred in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s in the perspective
of the achievement of the single market: the concomitant combination of a new harmonisation method
                                                
9 Temporary committee of inquiry into BSE , Report on alleged contraventions or maladministration in the
implementation of Community law in relation to BSE, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Community
and national courts, Rapporteur: Mr Manuel Medina Ortega,
http://www.europarl.eu.int/conferences/bse/a4002097_en.htm
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for a systematic regulation of food, and the acknowledgement of the role played by consumption in the
economic dynamism of the single market.
- First (2.1) we will show that the changes to the method of systematic harmonisation, in order
to reaffirm the principle of Subsidiarity, can be counted as the first act of harmonisation of
food “systems” in the EU.
- Second (2.2) we will show how consumer policies developed and how this created a
favourable  ground for the later changes in the aftermath of the BSE crisis (part 3).
3.1 From the elimination of national customs to the conception of an EU
food policy
One of the guiding preoccupations which led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957) was
thecreation of a Customs Union which would cover all trade in goods. The establishment of a free
trade union implied the systematic prohibition of all kind of customs duties on imports and exports
between Member States. The systematic elimination of national customs necessitated at least a
minimum of “harmony” between the different national legislation. For this, the Treaty foresaw the
“approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the common
market” (EC Treaty, art.3). One of the first important programmes of harmonisation was launched by
the European Commission in 1969. The Programme for the Elimination of Technical Obstacles to
Trade10 related to foodstuffs and identified areas of harmonisation around processed foodstuffs such as
butter, pasta, ice-cream, soft drinks, beer or cheese. This inaugurated a period of systematic regulation,
product by product, laying down standards for the control of all aspects of food such as raw materials,
manufacturing processes, ingredients and labelling. This was according to an approach known as the
‘vertical approach’. But this method was found cumbersome, expensive and finally relatively
inefficient. The “Cecchini report11” identified a total of 218 non-tariff barriers to trade in processed-
product sectors and estimated the loss for the Food Industry at 500 to 1,000 million ECU per year
(Ottaway,1995).  To remedy the situation, the Commission’s “White Paper on the completion of the
internal market in the foodstuffs sector” (1985) proposed to delimitate the intervention domain of the
Community to areas related to “health”, “fair practices” and “environment” and proposed that in all
the other domains the application of the “principle of mutual recognition” by the member states. As
summarised in an EC Green Paper:
“the Commission indicated that in principle it would no longer put forward proposals for the
harmonization of quality specifications, such as rules relating to the composition or
manufacture of foodstuffs which are not related to the protection of public health.  Instead, the
Commission believed mutual recognition could be achieved by reinforcing the labelling rules to
guarantee consumer information and fair trading.”
Under the principle of recognition, products and services made in compliance with the requirements of
one member state can not anymore be prevented from being sold in any other member state. The new
                                                
10 General Programme of 28 May 1969 for the elimination of technical barriers to trade which result from
disparities between the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
Official Journal C 076 , 17/06/1969 P. 0001 - 0001
11 "The European Challenge - 1992. The Benefits of a single market". Paolo Cecchini
Wildwood House 1988, in
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harmonisation inspired from the “Cassis de Dijon” judgments,  foresaw that EEC actions to ensure the
free circulation of products was to be methodically undertaken by one of two means: either by
approximation of the Members States’ laws in the areas related to “consumer health”, “fair practices”
and “environment”; or by ensuring that the principle of mutual recognition was correctly applied by
Member States, in full respect of the principle of Subsidiarity12.  The systematic vertical harmonisation
on a product per product basis was then replaced by fewer “horizontal” covering directives to regulate
“Food additives”13, “Food labelling and presentation”14, “Materials in contact with food”15, “Food
control” 16, “Food hygiene”17 and “Food for particular nutritional uses”18. For all other standards, not
directly related to health, fairness and environment, the control of the correct application of the
principle of mutual recognition is left to the vigilance of the States, and if no arrangement  is possible,
to the European Court of Justice.
Community food legislation National food legislation
Mandatory requirements relative to
- protection of public health;
- protection of other consumer interests,
- fair trading;
- need to ensure appropriate official controls.
Vertical harmonisation :
(Regulations)
Laying down detailed specifications for a specific
type of foodstuff.
- cocoa and chocolate
- sugars
- honey
- fruit juices
- jams
- jellies and marmalades
- preserved milk
- coffee extracts
- mineral waters.
Horizontal Harmonisation :
(Directives)
- Food labelling and presentation
- Additives
- Materials contact with food
- Food control
- Food for particular nutritional uses
Voluntary vertical regulation
Exception in the field of Agriculture in relation to
EC subsidies
All the other domains
Application of the
- Principle of Mutual Recognition
(European Court of Justice in case of dispute)
A Member state should allow to circulate
freely in its territory goods produced or
marketed in conformity with the rules, tests or
standards found in another Member State
which offer an equivalent level of protection to
its own rules, tests or standards
- Use of voluntary instruments, such as
standardization or codes of practice.
                                                
12 Under this principle, Community rules only when the aim of the envisaged action cannot be obtained
satisfactorily  at a lower level
13 Council Directive on Food Additives 89/107/EEC
14 This Council Directive on Food Labelling and presentation 79/112/EEC entered in force earlier,  in  1979
15 Council Directive  on the Materials and Articles in Contact with Foodstuffs  89/109/EEC
16 Council Directive on Control of Foodstuffs 89/397/EEC
17 Council Directive on the Hygiene of foodstuffs 93/43/EEC
18 Council Directive on foodstuffs intended for particular nutritional uses 89/398/EEC
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A brief description of some of the most important directives illustrates how extensive and all-
encompassing they are. The “Food Control” directive provides general principles for control and
inspection of all aspects of food processing to be applied by Member States’ competent authorities.
These controls affect not only ingredients, additives, material intended to come into contact with
foodstuffs, cleaning and maintenance processes; but also the environment of fabrication including
inter alia the premises, offices, plant surroundings, transport and machinery equipments. The directive
also requires people in contact with the process or part of the process of production of foodstuffs to be
subject to inspection. This “Food Control” directive is complemented by a “Food Hygiene” directive
which determines what general hygiene principles must be applied to foodstuffs when prepared,
treated, processed, transported; and to personnel when in contact with foodstuffs. Harmonisation is
often accompanied by a choice of which standard to be used as a reference, the directives advise
Member states to encourage economic actors to apply. on an international basis. the Codex
Alimentarius general principles on food hygiene or, on a European basis, EN29000. The directives
also encourage the HACCP19 method to be promoted to economic actors for the identification along
the food processing chain of critical points with regard to food safety.
To secure this harmonisation system, member countries are prevented from introducing new standards
without EC authorisation. A Standing Committee on Foodstuffs20 is established to be consulted in the
cases where countries intend to maintain, amend or introduce national provisions for hygiene or food
control. To be accepted by the Commission, the amendments must not be more stringent than those
defined by the European directives.
Having said that the EC “would no longer put forward proposals for the harmonization of quality
specifications (…) which are not related to the protection of public health”, and that the principle of
recognition should apply in other cases, one could conclude that since the adoption of this new
approach the division of responsibilities was quite clear between EU and Member States. But the
multidimensionality of food does not make it easy to determine on what grounds a food regulation
should be based. The determination of the main objective of a regulation is often controversial
between economic actors, between member countries, between the EU and member countries or even
between different EU institutions. Depending on their own division of responsibilities for food issues,
which depend on economical, historical and cultural factors, member countries have different
interpretations of what aims a regulation should have. As a consequence, to be successful this new
approach implies a minimum level of harmonisation between countries in framing, assessment and
management of food issues.  This will become particularly obvious during the food crises, particularly
BSE. But before that, in 1992, the countries tried to maintain their existing systems and protect their
food markets from growing competition.
One of the strategies of the member states to protect some of their food producers in a increasingly
competitive market was to support private protection initiatives on the basis of quality21.  For instance,
                                                
19 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points system is designed to prevent food contamination by identifying
potentially unsafe links in the food processing chain.
20 Functionally speaking, the StCF is the joint political organ of the member states designed to support and
control the Commission ” DG SANCO website, Regulatory Committees
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/rc/index_en.html
21 As well summarised by the general advocate of the ECJ, “it is recognised  by the Article 28 EC (which
prohibits any measure hindering intra-Community trade) may have prompted producers to seek refuge in
industrial property rights, that is to say to endeavour to compensate for the lost national statutory protection from
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France and Italy supported agro-food sector initiatives to create niche markets based on specific
characteristics or regional identities, on the ground that they had a positive impact on rural
development, as they produce “quality” foods appreciated by an increasing number of consumers.
Quality issues being not included in the three areas of harmonisation defined, these protected
appellations should have been rejected at the EU level. However, under pressure of France, in order to
remain faithful to its commitment towards “The Future of Rural Society"22 at a time of CAP reform,
and in anticipation of a growing consumer demand for quality products23,  the EC choose to issue new
regulations that aimed to protect categories of regional products. This is an important breach in the
philosophy of the single free market. These regulations related to Origin and Geographical
Indications24, to specific characteristics25, and to organic production - allowing some food and non-
food products to be exceptions to the rule of the free single market. Other countries, particularly in
northern Europe, choose other quality strategies. While the countries of southern Europe have
accorded greater importance for the support of products of certified origin (France, Italy, Spain and to
a lesser extent Portugal), northern countries have preferred a system of registration of certification
marks (Barjolle and Sylvander (2000), Thiedig and Sylvander (2000), Lucatelli (2000)).
The new horizontal approach that restricted protection of the food market to only that for reasons of
health, environment and fair trade, had another consequence. It increased the number of disputes
between trade partners and producers in the single market. The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
became the only legitimate arbiter in these disputes. Its role became of primary importance and its
responsibilities seen as too important considering what was at stake: the functioning of the single
market. For the Commission, there was obviously a danger of increasing conflict and dispute between
economic actors and between states without and solution of the root causes. On the one hand the new
approach stimulated competition among the national regulators (Majone, 1996) and on the other  the
new integration philosophy “less regulation for better regulation” tended to “judiciarise” the economic
integration process, not to organise it.
As soon as 1992, the Commission acknowledged the weak performance of the approaches adopted up
to then  and envisaged a more global food legislative framework26.
“The legislation is (…) based on a complex division of responsibilities between the Commission
and the Member States. The situation is complicated and difficult to understand, not only for the
average citizen, but sometimes also for the specialist. This has led to criticisms that the
Community lacks a coherent policy towards the foodstuffs sector as a whole, and approaches
problems piecemeal”.
                                                                                                                                                        
competition by creating new rights as protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications””
Opinion of advocate general ALBER delivered on 25 April 2002 Case C-108/01 (1) Consorzio del Prosciutto di
Parma (2) Salumificio S. Rita SpA v (1) Asda Stores Limited (2) Hygrade Foods Limited, source : CURIA (ECJ
website)
22 Document published by the European Commission in 1988.
23 ‘It has been observed in recent years that consumers are tending to attach greater importance to the quality of
foodstuffs rather than to quantity;’ Extracts from Council Reg.  (EEC)No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the
protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs.
24 regulation 2081/92/EEC
25 regulation 2082/92/EEC
26Green Paper, 1997
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The “principle of mutual recognition” is not able to significantly reduce the heavy task of the
programme of economic integration. Detailed monitoring of the application by Member states and
economic actors of the principle of mutual recognition lead the Commission to formulate an
alternative approach. More collaboration with market actors and expert players, and a more
“integrated” Community food law27 was necessary to accelerate the process of harmonisation in the
new SEM. An EU food policy (and not just a set of regulations) was not born, but at least conceived in
the Commission.
In terms of division of responsibility for food issues in the member countries, the introduction of the
horizontal approach inspired from the Cassis de Dijon judicial decision, is of primary importance as it
can be seen as a calculated or uncalculated community attempt to harmonise not only the legislation
but also the food system in the member states. The countries are forced to agree altogether and to find
consensus on the delimitation on what is a food “health” issue, therefore member states need to find
these agreements first of all between the different agents and actors of their own food system. One can
conclude that the establishment of the SEM and the new harmonisation approach have constituted a
decisive step towards an Europeanization of the member states’ food systems. This hypothesis should
be tested with the results obtained in the member countries studied in the TIF project.
What we will see further is that this Europeanisation of food issues has been institutionalised at the EU
level in the aftermaths of the BSE crisis. But before that, let us consider the impact of the development
of a future EU consumer policy.
3.2 Towards an EU Consumer policy
The first years of the 1990s saw the development of an “EU consumer policy” that was not expected
only a few years before. As Geoffrey Woodroffe wrote in 1984:
“National parliaments have more “power” than the European Parliament; national farmers’,
producers’, bankers’, traders’ or standardisation associations, trade unions or consumer
organisations have generally more influence than the corresponding European organisations,
which generally are financed, staffed and influenced in their policy by national interests.
“Thinking federal” appears not to be a formula that applies to any relevant political, economic
or social body at EEC level. These introductory remarks seem to suggest that action taken in the
interest of consumer should best left to national authorities and that the EEC should not deal
with consumer protection ”.
Although this extract does not precisely represent the overall thoughts of its author, it demonstrates the
unpopularity of a consumer policy that could come from Brussels. As has been noted, consumer
protection was only vaguely mentioned in the 1985 White Paper (Kendall, 1996:9). Once the EU
began to implement the internal market programme, consumer protection started to be recognised as
unfairly neglected and was eventually found to be of prime importance in the functioning of the single
                                                
27 . “In contrast to legislation in most of the Member States, Community food law has developed piecemeal, over
time, and there is no central unifying text setting out the fundamental principles of Community food law and
clearly defining the obligations of those concerned” Green paper : The general principles of food law in the
European Union COM(97) 176 final
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market. In a working document published by the Commission in 199228, one can read a first
justification of an EC consumer policy, argued in market terms:
“The single market cannot be a success without the active participation of consumers and this
participation is dependent on consumers having confidence that their interests will be protected
as much in Community-wide market as in their national markets. The Single Market playing
field is far from ‘level’ with so many different levels of consumer protection which distort
competition.”
 The Single European Act (1987) recognised “a high level of consumer protection” as one of several
objectives for the completion of the Single Market; the Maastricht TEU (1992) lifted this objective to
the rank of a legal basis of the Treaty29.  In 1989, an independent Consumer Policy Service was set up
that would become a full DG for Consumer policy in 1995.
1987 Single European Act (SEA)
Article 100A:  Concerning consumer protection, the
Commission will take as a base “a high level of protection".
1989 Establishment of an Independent Consumer Policy Service
(CPS)
1992 “High level of consumer protection” becomes a legal basis.
Art 129a of the Treaty of European Union
1995 CPS becomes a full Directorate-General, the DG XXIV for
Consumer Policy
Table 1: Four key dates for the Development of the EU Consumer policy
The development of a common consumer policy was not solely motivated by the achievement of the
SEM (Single European Market), although that was its first legitimate justification regarding the basis
of the Treaty. Within the context of the pre-Maastricht period, it found other justifications. One of
them was the need to achieve “credible policy commitments” (Majone,1996). The Community,
reduced to a “regulatory body”, is highly dependent on the member states and devoid of “any power to
tax and spend” in social matters and welfare-state activities. The development of a consumer policy
must be seen in the more general need for expertise from market players, NGOs and scientists to
develop “supportive networks” in order to reduce decision making cost and ensure “input-
legitimation”30. Despite their poor capacity as experts, Consumer organisations have, for the
Commission, an appreciable power of “input-legitimisation”. Added to this the pressure from the
European Parliament - particularly since the introduction of direct elections  - who continuously
criticised the absence of any commitment from the Commission and Council to develop an EU
                                                
28 Consumer Policy in the European Community – An overview, Commission document, DN :MEMO/92/68,
source : EUROPA
29 by introducing the Art.129a
30 “Supportive networks seek to secure input-legitimation by allowing the concerned actors to take part in policy-
shaping (…) in which the Commission fosters, and taps, ‘local horizontal capital’.(…)At the same time,
networks also try to create support for European policies by distributing benefits and regulatory advantages to
the actors in the networks, thereby creating output-legitimation” A.Héritier (1999)
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consumer policy, one understands the Commission’s shift towards more consideration for Consumer
organisations and the interests they defend. The Council, which represents the member states, was in a
more ambiguous position. While claiming the necessity of an EU consumer policy and supporting
Treaty amendments in favour of a common approach towards consumer problems, it represents
member states that were greatly divided on the conception of such a policy. As written in a
Commission working paper:
“While agreeing with the underlying premises that market globalisation presented consumer
protection with new challenges  and that a balanced market is important for consumers, the
Majority of Member states considered that a perfectly competitive market, fully taking into
account consumer interests, does not exist. Hence, to a varying degree, they expressed support
for an active policy at the Community level. (…)”
Further the document acknowledges that the discourse is not followed by national support:
 “Although the adoption of measures for the achievement of the internal market does not
require anymore –since the Single European Act- unanimity, it was difficult to find sufficient
political support for consumer policy acts and a common denominator between these
approach” 31.
There is a gap between intention and action because the contours of an EU consumer policy are still
very imprecise. Rather, it appears as an opportunistic means to gain citizen legitimacy, as is shown
quite explicitly in another Commission document32:
“The recent public debates concerning the Maastricht Treaty have highlighted the need to bring
the EC closer to the citizen. Where better to start than with consumer policy which is concerned
with concrete day-to-day aspects of life?”.
What was probably not seen clearly at the time is that the argument was also reversible and that a
consumer crisis of confidence could in return affect the legitimacy of EU institutions.
The pre-BSE period is marked by the convergence of two projects: the establishment of EU food
policy and the development of a EU Consumer policy. Before the BSE (Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy) “crisis”, the Commission services already imagined the preparation of a general food
law directive (Ottaway,1995). A consumer policy was also supported to enhance consumer confidence
in cross-border trade. But there was no clear link between these intentions. In 1997, in the aftermaths
of the crisis, the essential of the main responsibilities for food issues will be transferred to a
Directorate General for the protection of consumers that did not exist just a few years before.
                                                
31 Consumer Policy : Past Achievements, Commission staff Paper , 1999, Source : EUROPA
32 Consumer Policy in the European Community – An overview, Commission document, DN :MEMO/92/68,
source : EUROPA
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4 European Parliament, food safety and consumer
interests
In the beginning of the 1990s we have two EU policies in development: a food policy and a consumer
policy - both developed for single market efficiency. The EU institutions, recoiling after food crises
and the opportunistic behaviour of members of parliament (MEPs), will rapidly understand that no
food policy is possible without a risk management policy. Pulling national food policies up to the EU
level had a political cost that was addressed by the development EU food risk policy for the protection
of consumer health and interests. The aim of this third part of the report is to show how the BSE, or
rather the treatment of the BSE crisis by the European Parliament, succeeded in putting the
“Consumer” (rather than consumption and although the “Consumer” was very ill-defined) at the centre
of a new EU food policy.
Firstly (3.1) we show that the introduction of the co-decision procedure and the opportunistic positions
of the European Parliament during and immediately after the BSE crisis (1996) have succeed in
transforming the “factor consumption” into the figure of “consumer”, protection of which will be the
first aim of food regulation.
 
Secondly (3.2), we describe the main changes due to the food system restructuration in the aftermath
of the BSE crisis. These changes led to a complete reorganisation of responsibilities for food issues in
the Commission and the introduction of a food risk policy. Although two domains remained uncertain,
this “new departure” for a EU food policy appears to have been the most significant change in
European food policies since the Treaty of Rome.
4.1 New role and strategy of the European Parliament
The new Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht) introduced the co-decision procedure that
formally changed the balance of power between the community institutions. The greatest impact came
less from the European Parliament’s new formal position in the structure, than from its ability to
increase political pressure in raising awareness of an “EU democratic deficit” (Corbett et al.,2000). As
argued by Farrell and Héritier (2002), it is indirectly, by the creation of informal institutions to
facilitate negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council33 that the co-decision
procedure finally increased the power of the EP:
 “Parliament won most of the concessions that it sought; its bargaining position was enhanced
by its relative insensitivity to failure (its willingness to bring down items of legislation or block
them), its different time horizons (it was more prepared to delay legislation than Council) and
its possession of strategic resources (MEPs were better able than the understaffed Council to
deal with tortuous conciliation procedures)”.
The following example will illustrate this bargaining between the EU institutions. It shows that the EP,
supported by the Commission placed under great pressure by the Ortega report on BSE, contributed
                                                
33 They argue that the formal rules governing the co-decision process have led to the creation of informal
institutions which in turn have affected the course of constitutional change.
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opportunistically to successfully introduce the figure of “consumer” that placed its footprint in all the
post-1996 food regulations.
On 2 October 1996 the Commission submitted two proposals for regulations, one establishing a
system for the identification and registration of bovine animals and the other regarding the labelling of
beef and beef products. Those two proposals were based on Article 43 of the EC Treaty. Article 43
constitutes the legal basis for all rules concerning the production and marketing of agricultural
products such as “beef” listed in Annex II of the Treaty and which contributes to the implementation
of the objectives of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). Four months later, the proposals were
debated in a plenary session of the European Parliament. After examination, the EP adopted an
amendment designed to substitute Article 100a for Article 43. Article 100a is the legal basis when the
aim and content of a regulation is the protection of public health or the consumer protection. This
substitution would have been a matter of procedure if it did not imply a change of decision procedure.
By changing article 43 into article 100a the proposals were placed under the “co-decision procedure”
instead of the “consultation procedure”. In the co-decision procedure the European Parliament co-
decides with the Council while in the consultation procedure the Council decides and the European
Parliament opinion is only consultative. The Commission accepted some of the EP amendments and
merged the two proposals in one single amended proposal on the basis of Article 100a (co-decision).
But a few months later, the Council re-amended the legal basis in favour of article 43 (consultation)
and in April 1997 adopted unanimously the regulation.
The Commission brought an action for the annulment of the regulation before the European Court of
Justice. The justification of the Commission was the following: although beef is listed in Annex II of
the Treaty and consequently part of a common organisation of the market, the main aim of the
regulation is not an objective of agricultural policy but an aim of protection of human health,
especially in the background of the BSE crisis. The Commission recognised that “labelling” had no
direct link with health protection, but as reported in the European Court report, claimed that “in the
present case” (i.e. after BSE crisis), the measures taken were intended solely to provide consumers
with information on the origin of the product and therefore certain characteristics of the production to
assure that the product poses no risk to their health. The Commission insisted that the particular
context was responsible for this regulation and therefore it should have been based on 100a. The
European Parliament in supporting the Commission’s request went further, establishing the link
between labelling and consumer health that the Commission had not dared to make. For the EP, the
“principal, if not sole, aim was to create an uninterrupted chain which enables the consumer to check
each individual stage of the process from the origin to consumption”. For its defence, the Council
protested that the regulation did not primarily seek to protect human health but rather aimed to restore
consumer confidence in both the market and the products in order to encourage stability in a market
thrown into crisis by BSE. The protection of human and animal health was a “secondary” aim of the
Regulation. This justified why, for the Council, it was rightly based on Article 43 and not on Art 100.
The Court of Justice gave reason to the Commission and concluded that the regulation should have
been placed under both articles, and not just on 43, and annulled the Council Regulation (EC) No
820/97 but preserved its effects until new rules were established on the subject.
What this example demonstrates is that at a certain point of EU history there was no other possibility
but to prioritise objectives previously indiscernible: consumer or market. If. in the official discourse,
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“consumer interests” had always been considered compatible with the producer interests in the single
market, this was not the case anymore.
At the time of the hearing before the ECJ, all parties finally agreed that the regulation should have
been based on both articles 43 and 100a.  One wonders why at the time of the making of regulation
this option was not retained and no consensual position emerged. By examining the amendments of
the first parliamentary reading session, it appears that the most contentious issues between the
institutions were whether or not labelling should be made optional or compulsory and whether or not
the name of the country had to be reported in the label addressed to the final consumer. In a single
European market where all goods are free to circulate, the Commission did at first not see any
justification to oblige producers to label beef with the name of country of origin, therefore it supported
an “EU” label, and based its first version of the proposal in article 43. The Council also shared this
position and supported an optional rather than compulsory system of country identification. The EP
Committee34 understood the position as a market-oriented strategy to allow BSE countries to hide
behind anonymous labels, while at the same time “BSE free” countries would be given a market
advantage by putting their name on their beef products. For the EP, this unfair option based on the
ignorance of the consumer was unacceptable 35. Despite the practical difficulties to set up such a
system, the EP committee stood firm:
“Obviously, this solution has certain drawbacks, chief of which being the need for a great deal
of intervention, regulation and control of an administrative and managerial nature, and is
therefore somewhat more costly. However, it is clearly more appropriate given the magnitude of
the credibility problem we face”.
The EP went even further, asking for the extension of labelling to processed goods containing beef and
beef products “within one year of the entry into force of the regulation”. The Commission proposed a
transitory period where the system would be optional until it would become compulsory.  We know
the end of the story: the Council interrupted the process of co-decision in changing the basis of the
Treaty, voted on its own a regulation that retained the optional labelling with name of country until
2000 when the system was supposed to become compulsory. By interrupting the procedure, the
Council did not succeed in avoiding the establishment of a compulsory system of identification but
only to postpone it. The Council lost the judgment and had to pay the costs of the court procedure. But
the regulation was not withdrawn and was left in place for implementation until another would
substitute it 36. Has the European Parliament really won the case? Certainly yes “in principle”, as
                                                
34 The Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection Committee Rapporteur: Mr Mihail Papayannakis
35 Quotation of the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection
(Rapporteur: Mr Mihail Papayannakis) “the basic problem with the Regulation is that it provides for an optional
rather than a compulsory system of labelling beef and beef products, even exempting some of the latter such as
canned products etc. Your rapporteur has the impression that the authors of the Regulation took the following
line of reasoning: consumers are worried and distrustful because when they buy the products concerned they do
not know their origin and they may therefore come from areas or countries where BSE is rife. They will avoid
this risk if they know that these products come from other regions. We will therefore entitle producers in 'other'
regions to declare the origin of their products using certain specifications and therefore give them an advantage
over producers in the 'suspect' regions, who will definitely not use the labelling system!”
36 It was replaced a few years later by two new regulations that foresaw a compulsory labelling after a period of
optional trial . Regulation (EC) N°1760/2000 of the EP and of the Council establishing a system for the
identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and
repealing  Council Regulation (EC) N°820/97
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“consumer interest protection” could not be ignored any more in the making of any related food
regulations including ones related to the formerly protected agriculture domain. In practice, the victory
is qualified. A new regulation with a compulsory labelling system is in force but not yet correctly
implemented. The last FVO report published for the year 2002 reveals important failures in the
implementation of the regulation on traceability and labelling of beef and minced beef37.
The following points can be concluded from this event in relation to the role of the EP to introduce
“consumer concerns” in the economic heart of the single market:
- Undoubtedly, “BSE One38” has to some extent been both pedagogic and cathartic (Westlake,
1997) and as put by a member of the Commission “The BSE demonstrates the full panoply of the
Parliament’s post-Maastricht powers”. It gave to the European Parliament the opportunity to
affirm its role of defender of the consumer, fully using its new found Maastricht Treaty powers to
investigate ‘alleged contraventions and maladministration’ of the EU treatment of BSE.
- Whatever the economic, administrative practicable difficulties to set up a reliable compulsory
system, the EP supported it and proposed the enlargement of the system to beef derived food
products. This introduced into the debate the threat of enlargement to all meat products and not
just beef products.
- The EP sent a clear signal to the two other main actors of regulation that from then on it will
closely monitor decisions taken in the agriculture sector39. With “pugnacious assertiveness of its
right and its ingenuity in exploiting grey areas” in beef labelling and traceability, the Parliament
made it clear to the EU institutions that they would ‘in future, be held fully accountable for their
actions” (Mann cit. Westlake,1996).
- In the EP intentions, traceability and labelling is a tool for consumer control over all steps of the
food chain (regulation to “enable the consumer to check each individual stage of the process from
the origin to consumption”) Whatever the practicability of such a statement, it seems
unprecedented that at the level of decision making, a regulation is envisaged to be a means of
direct control by “consumers” on “economic actors”.
- The measures undertaken after the BSE political crisis in the EU institutions, “in the name of
consumer”, have not been a response to consumer organisation campaigns. Although there were
consumer organisation and NGO campaigns against Hormones in Beef and GMOs, there were
none on animal feedstuffs before the BSE crisis. Is it the responsibility of the EU institutions to
address this problem? Further investigation needs to be made on this point. At least “BSE” has
probably ended the period where the consumer organisations were the legitimate and exclusive
                                                
37 “in the later stage of the production chain, from wholesale cutting and processing establishments through to
the storage, distribution and retail stages, it was often not possible for the movement and origin of meat to be
traced with a sufficient level of certainty” Document SANCO 9505/2003 : Overview report of a series of
missions carried out in all member states during 2002 in order to evaluate the operation of controls over the
traceability  of beef and minced beef. Dated 12/09/03
38 “BSE one” was employed by interviewees at DG SANCO to design the crisis happened in 1996 and by
reference to “BSE two” that happened in France in 1999 but had much less mediatic echo.
39 As written in the report of the EP Committee already  cited : (…) “It is obvious that restoring confidence calls
for a radical overhaul of developments hitherto, particularly in relation to agriculture and the farming industry.”
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defender of consumer interests. The crisis has ruined the idea of a harmonious relationship
between the consumer and market. But this was not to replace it by an antagonistic relation where
the consumer should be protected from the market excess. It has introduced a new “figure”, and
perhaps more significantly a new “aim” in EC policy: the incessant quest for a “confident
consumer” whose behaviour would be as predictable as was “consumption”. The BSE crisis
created a “consumer”, independent from “consumption”. This happened because of a particular
emotional context when it was impossible to predict what the eventual number of BSE victims
would be. One interviewee, employed in the EU veterinary services at the time of the BSE crisis,
explained how almost “suddenly” after “BSE one”, the consumer began to be a sort of
incalculable, irrational but omnipresent figure in food related discussions within DG Agriculture.
“BSE one has brought the consumer into the picture (…) before, 4 years ago there was
internal discussion, everyone talked of tonnes of food, tonnes of meat, and exports, imports,
market balances (…) you calculate the production, remove the likely exports, add the likely
imports and then you calculate the figure of consumption etc.  But.. but.. do you have an
independent estimate of the consumption?!  the expected consumption?  How do you know,
independently how much people will eat next year?!  You could ask people and they can
give you their guesses. "well I think it's.." .... but it is not an exact science! Also again,
because the meat industry is fragmented, its not like , its not like there are only 2 or 3
players in Europe and they have done market testing, questionnaires: "if the price of beef
was this, would you eat more" etc. etc. “I think that was just the beginning of the consumer,
well. the beginning,.. its always been there, the raison d'etre for producing food. But it’s
like far more present in peoples' minds. Before, it was much more efficiency driven, now
people say : “but who is going to eat it ?” (interview MC, DG Agriculture).
4.2 A “new departure” for EU food policy
Before the outbreak, the Community lacked a “coherent concept of risk regulation” to accommodate
the complexities of science-based decision-making40. The Commission relied entirely on the Scientific
Committee on Foodstuffs (SCF) which, at least superficially, appeared to function well (Ellen Vos,
2000).  The temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE definitely demolished this image. Evidence of
mismanagement, influence on the Veterinary Scientific and Standing Committees by “British
thinking”, policies of disinformation, manipulation preventing any debate between the different EC
institutions, lack of cooperation between the DGs and between DGs and the relevant Scientific
Committees was highlighted41. In response to what was quickly understood as a major EU institutional
crisis, Commission President Santer delivered a solemn speech42 before the European Parliament in
which he declared his surprise at “the lack of openness, coordination and rigour in the proceedings of
                                                
40 To aggregate the different interests, a committee structure (known as “comitology”) was established. The
“scientific committee on foodstuffs” composed of scientific experts, the “advisory committee on foodstuffs”
consisting of interests groups  representative and the “standing committee on foodstuffs” composed of national
representatives, aim to incorporate in the decision-making process various social and economic interest,
scientific advice and ensure the approval of the member countries in the implementing phase.
41 “The report on alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law in
relation to BSE, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Community and national courts”
42 Bulletin EU 1/2-1997 Speech by Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, to Parliament on 18
February 1997
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the scientific committees”, and admitted that “Commission departments were not as effective as they
might have been”. Before the MEPs, he promised a rapid and vast institutional and legislative reform
affecting the administrative structure of the Commission, the system of scientific consultation, the
decision-making process, the inspection controls and the Community legal bases. A few weeks later,
the “New Departure” Commission document43 was published, detailing the programme announced by
President Santer. It started with a very general statement that seemed to apply to all Community
policy:
“The principal objective of the new political departure is reinforcement of the protection of
consumer health. For this purpose, food safety is a necessary prerequisite. Moreover, in order
to restore the confidence of the consumer and answer concerns over some models of production
in which productivity is over emphasised, it is also important to protect animal and plant health
and to respect animal welfare”.
It was a clear inversion of political priorities: the principal aim was from now the protection of
consumer health and not the limitation of food safety measures to restrict misuse due to protectionist
intentions of member countries. But this formal rupture was immediately limited in a later paragraph
that says “(food safety) is also at the very root of a proper functioning of the market”44 as if the single
market still had to be the ultimate justification. The substance of the document deserves to be detailed
as it defines the basis of the future EU food policy. The Commission announces its intention to
establish a risk policy that respects the following separations:
- responsibility for legislation separated from that for scientific consultation;
- responsibility for legislation separated from that for inspection.
In risk analysis, the Commission commits to approach the issue in three separate steps: through
assessment45, management46 and communication47 of the risks but without really entering into great
detail on the highly criticised feasibility of such sharing48. The model which inspired the President was
the U.S. FDA (Food and Drug Administration).  As announced by Jacques Santer, the Community
inspections were enlarged to cover the whole chain, following a “plough to plate” approach. In terms
of institutional reorganisation, it was intended to place all the Scientific Committees dealing with food
issues under the responsibility of DGXXIV renamed DG Consumer Policy and Consumer Health
                                                
43 Communication of the Commission on health consumers and Food Safety COM(97) 183
44 “Recent experience has clearly demonstrated that food safety is not only of concern to the consumer, but is
also at the very root of a proper functioning of the market. Food safety is therefore not only a prerequisite for
protecting consumer health but will also serve the interests of producers and those involved in processing and
marketing of foodstuffs and relevant agricultural products.”. (IP 97/360 Brussels, 30 April 1997 Consumer
Health : towards a proper food policy)
45 “Risk assessment allows the identification and evaluation of hazards to consumer health, based on an
estimation of the probability of their appearance in a specific situation”
46 “The essential task of risk management is to contain or reduce the level of risk identified through the
assessment procedure in order to achieve an appropriate level of protection”.
47 “through risk communication, information is exchanged between the parties concerned on the nature of the
hazard and the measures to be taken to control it.”
48 Numerous are the observers in political science who expresses scepticism on this sharing, notably in case of
scientific uncertainty. Ellen Vos: “What is strikingly lacking in the 1997 New Approach of the Commission is
the manner in which the Community needs to deal with uncertainty, to define what is acceptable risk, and thus to
define the role of the precautionary principle as a regulatory principle of food regulation. In other words,
attention should be paid not only to the scientific facts, but also the manner in which one deals with them.”
(Ellen Vos, 2000).
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Protection and withdrawn from DGs Industry and Agriculture in order to avoid conflicts of interest in
the decisions of the Committees. Furthermore, the work of the scientists appointed to the committees
will be based on the principle of independence, transparency and excellence.
Undoubtedly, the reform announced by Santer kept its promises as it designed the principles on which
an EU food policy including a risk analysis policy should lay. But it failed to be convincing on two
important points, the way to deal with risk assessments in cases of scientific uncertainty and the
inherent contradictions of the new policy agenda of the EU and its duties as a trade partner in the
WTO.
“it is important to ensure that our internal legislation and procedures provide adequate
reassurance for our trading partners and that our exports do not encounter unjustified
restrictions in gaining access to the world market. (…)Decisions on food safety are taken in the
context of the rights and obligations that flow from them, in the WTO, in other international
organisations and bilaterally.”(ibid)
The EU stands in a paradoxical position. If the internal market cannot be a priority with regard to food
safety, if the objective seems clearly separated, then in the international arena the EU is committed to
apply slightly different rules49.
5 Formal division of responsibilities for food issues at
the EU level in 2003
This part describes the reorganisation of the post-1997 EU food system. Firstly (4.1) we describe
briefly what appeared to be the shifts of responsibilities caused by this reorganisation. Secondly (4.2)
we describe the shifts that make DG Consumer Health and Protection the main unit responsible for
food safety along the entire food chain. Thirdly (4.3) we describe how the responsibilities for other
food issues are shared between others General Directorates.
5.1 The reorganisation of the EU food system following the BSE crisis
(1997)
The structural reorganisation that followed the BSE crisis has been described in documents published
by the European Parliaments and the Commission, and also analysed in academic detail in political
science from different angles and perspectives, and at different periods of the evolution of the system
(for instance Barling (1998), Vos (2000), Millstone E. (2002) etc). When a first reorganisation was
envisaged in 1997, the Scientific Committee for Food (SCF) and the Scientific Veterinary Committee
(SVC) were placed respectively under DG Industry (DGIII) and DG Agriculture (DGVI), responsible for
providing assessment on food safety and quality, animal health and welfare. In 1997, a first
                                                
49 ‘The Commission is at pains to point out that international guidelines on risk assessment are to be adhered to
by the committees, and that the treaty obligations laid down in the agreements at the end of the Uruguay round of
GATT managed by the WTO retain supremacy’. (Barling, )
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reorganisation occurred. It lay essentially on the modification of the commitology system: all the
scientific committees for issues where consumer interests are at stake were transferred to DG XXIV
(Consumer health protection). The internal market "product warning system" was transferred from
DGIII (Industry) , the Office for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Health Inspection (essentially food and
feed control) from DGVI to become the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO).
A second reorganisation occurred in 1999 with Commissioner Byrne. DG XXIV is renamed DG
Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO). The Agency model of the FDA desired by the
European Parliament (Buonanno, 2003) is abandoned for a system judged better adapted. The EU
institutions opted for an Authority with strict separation between assessment and management.  In the
White Paper, the Commission explains its preference for a strict separation of tasks:
- Firstly, there is a serious concern that a transfer of regulatory powers to an independent
Authority could lead to an unwarranted dilution of democratic accountability.(…)
- Secondly, the control function must be at the heart of the Commission's risk management
process if it is to act effectively on behalf of the consumer, notably in ensuring that
recommendations for action arising from control are properly followed up. The
Commission must retain both regulation and control if it is to discharge the responsibilities
placed upon it under the Treaties.(…)
- Thirdly, an Authority with regulatory power could not be created under the current
institutional arrangements of the European Union, and would require modification of t he
existing provisions of the EC Treaty50.
The result of this second reorganisation in 2002 that established a food law and a European Food
Safety Authority is the repartition shown in Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden..
Figure 2 : A strict separation between risk assessment and management
(source: from Laurie Buonanno, 2003)
                                                
50 COM (1999) 719 final White Paper in Food Safety
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5.2 The formal attribution of DG SANCO since 1997
Since 1997, the responsibility for food issues lies on a unique Directorate General:  DG SANCO. Four
of the seven directorates of DG SANCO are devoted to Food Safety (3) and Food Control (1). One
directorate is responsible for Consumer affairs other than food. One directorate is responsible for
Public Health and deals with nutrition issues. SANCO is responsible for
- ensuring a high level of food safety through farm-to-table measures, and
- ensuring effective control systems and evaluate compliance with EU standards in the food
safety and quality, animal health, animal welfare, animal nutrition and plant health sectors
within the EU and in third countries in relation to their exports to the EU;
It has in charge the management of the relations with the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA),
and the management of risk (completing assessments by the EFSA).  It is responsible for farm animal
welfare.  In conformity with article 152 of the Treaty, DG SANCO units have in charge to assure “a
high level of human health protection” in the development of all Community policies. In this frame
DG SANCO expresses nutrition recommendations in the Community policies and implements Public
Health programmes.
A : General Affairs
D : Scientific Opinions  Management
C : Public Health
B : Consumer Affairs
E : Food Safety
production and distribution chain
F : Food Safety
Plant Health Animal health & welfare
International questions
G : Food and Veterinary Office
(Food Control)
Sanco
FOOD SAFETY & CONTROL
NUTRITION
ETHICS : animal welfare
DG Health and Consumer Protection
Bruxelles
Dublin
Strasbourg
Localisation:
Figure 3 : Organisation of DG SANCO related to Food issues
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5.3 Food responsibilities outside SANCO
Quality policy (according to the restricted meaning of the Commission which excludes nutrition and
safety) is the only core issue that is not dealt by DG SANCO. Rather, responsibility lies on DG
Agriculture. After the 1997 reorganisation of Food policy, only one scientific committee dealing with
food remains in DG AGRI (the Scientific Committee on Designations of Origin, Geographical
Indications and Certificates of Specific Character) while all the others are placed under DG SANCO.
A standing committee dealing with Organic Farming gives opinion on the organic standard. All the
management committees in DG AGRI are involved in decisions about the specifications and the value
of the products. There is no institution within DG AGRI in charge of the control of animal welfare, but
farm animal welfare concerns is a justification for the decoupled system in the Common Agriculture
Policy Mid-Term Review adopted by the Commission in July 2002.
Amongst the missions of DG Trade,  three can be related to Food policy :
- to define  the trade interests of the EU;
- to negotiate bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements on the basis of negotiating
directives proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Council ;
- to monitor and ensure the implementation of international agreements, notably SPS
(Sanitary and Phytosanitary)  and TBT (Technical Barrier to Trade) WTO agreements.
DG RTD (Research) supports various fields of research on food. Food, Nutrition and health is Key
Action 1 of the ‘Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources Programme’ implemented
under the Fifth Framework Programme (1999-2002) of DG RDT. The Sixth Framework Programme
(2002-2006) includes the theme ‘Food Quality and Safety’. Nutrition-related projects are also funded
by the EU such as the Eurodiet project (1998-2000) on nutrition and healthy lifestyles; and the
European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC). DG RDT promotes research on
biotechnologies and application of GM technologies. 81 projects related to GMO have been funded
since 1985.
DG Environment is concerned by the impact on the environment of food production (GM issues,
pesticides etc.).
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Figure 4 : Repartition division of responsibilities for Food issues
6 “Nutrition”, “safety”, and “quality” food issues and
Institutionalisation of consumers
ince the consumer appeared in the debate, the constraints that this new figure brought into the EU food
landscape have been interpreted in many ways by the actors of the food chains. This new EU
“consumer” appears to have many facets. How the stakeholders, consumer organisations, NGOs,
international organisations and the different units of the directorate generals in the Commission that
deal with food issues have framed (or institutionalised) the consumer was an important expected
output of our survey and has been particularly  scrutinised during the data analysis phase. The
objective was to understand to what extent the actors’ solutions for food issues were linked to their
understanding of consumer problems.
The following sections examine how three food issues Nutrition (5.1), Quality (5.2) and Safety (5.3,
5.4, 5.5) are handled in the European Commission and, when relevant, the impact this has on the
positions of stakeholders, NGOs and Consumer organisations in relation to their representation of
consumers. The changes in responsibilities are too recent to draw important conclusions at this stage.
But some conclusions on what appears to be a fragmentation of the consumer at the EU level will be
given in the final section of the report.
6.1 Nutrition: a discrete approach
The debates in the European Parliament that we previously examined would imply that the opposition
between “Consumer” and “Market” interests would be overtaken, and that the different components of
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an integrated food policy would address simultaneously one and the other interests. But when looking
at food regulations and institutions in the EU, by key food issues (nutrition, safety, ethics, value for
money, quality), it appears that the EU institutions can not really manage to treat these two aspects in a
more integrated way. As we will show, in the domain of nutrition there remains a separation between
nutrition as a public health issue and nutrition as consumer choice. Despite a growing opinion calling
for an integrated approach (expressed by NGOs and stimulated by the World Health Organization
debates on nutrition), the EU approach remains “discrete”.
It is recognised within the EU institutions that no EU nutrition policy as such exists and that in the
matter a lot has still to be done to be in line with the Treaty, particularly since the introduction of
article 152: “a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and
implementation of all Community policies and activities”51. All European and more generally Western
countries face serious public health problem in relation to nutrition,  such as problem of deficiencies in
micronutrients, diet low in fibre and anti-oxidants, high in fat and salt, increasing intake of fat high-fat
meat and dairy products, creating obesity or cardio vascular diseases.  Over the past decade, the three
main EU institutions have expressed important concerns towards nutritional problems and the new
challenge they pose. But it seems difficult to address these problem  according to an integrated
approach as advised in in WHO Europe (2000) and EU presidency reports (2000).
The proposition of the EU French Presidency (2000) to draw the lines of a EU nutrition policy was in
2003 not been effectively followed. Among its propositions : food and nutrition monitoring all over
the EU, European scientific expertise on nutrition, European training programmes in Public Health
Nutrition, Promotion of nutrition in and all through EU policies , development of EU dietary
guidelines, and information on products for consumer protection, only the last one is in way of
realisation. According to the Commission, the EU framework for dietary guidelines which was a major
output of the EU funded project Eurodiet(2000) has been “put on hold since the establishment of such
guidelines would require a level of scientific consensus in Europe, which is presently not yet
achieved”52. The lack of consensus, clarity or coordination does not come only from the national
scientific communities. At the political level, in the three main EU institutions, there is still a gap
between intentions and actions.
In its White Paper on Food Safety (1999), the Commission is considering the development of a
“comprehensive and coherent” nutritional policy. This means a policy able to involve the different
actors of the food chain, the experts on nutrition and the intermediate institutions. The white paper also
foresees that “the scope of the Authority should be to provide scientific advice and information to the
Commission on all matters having a direct or indirect impact on consumer health and safety arising
from the consumption of food. (…) Its remit will encompass both risk and nutritional issues”(White
Paper  on Food Safety, 1999). But the lack of conviction of the Commission is perceptible by the very
                                                
51 ” Until now, however, despite the fact that the Treaty encourages Member States to co-operate on public
health policy matters, with the help of the Commission, there has been no European Plan of Action on Nutrition,
nor any common European dietary guidelines. As a result it is not just the strategies for improving nutrition
which have varied across the Union, the basic healthy eating messages have not been totally consistent. Given
the wide circulation of information that we observe now, this issue could become a problem if it is not
addressed”. Report ordered by the French Presidency in 2000, published by the Société Française de Santé
Publique : “Health and Human Nutrition – Elements for European Action”.
52 Policy initiatives on nutrition , presentation page in SANCO website source : EUROPA
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_determinants/life_style/nutrition/nutrition_policy_en.htm) source :
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limited detail on how to proceed. Although this document gives practical orientation related to food
safety, nothing is developed to give substance to EU nutrition orientations (Millstone et al, 2000).
Nutrition clearly separated from any safety issue seems to have been added without a deep conviction.
Indeed, the person responsible for nutrition in DG V confided to a specialised journal on food: “We
had enormous difficulty just getting one paragraph [on nutrition] in [the white paper] (EU Food Law,
May 2000)”.
A Council resolution53 was published in December 2000 nearly one year after the White Paper(1999)
and a few months after the French Presidency report (2000). Following some of the conclusions of the
report, the resolution officially recognizes the necessity of giving nutrition (“as one of the key
determinants of human health”) a particular attention and “that the state of health of the population can
therefore be protected and improved by targeting action on nutrition.” The resolution acknowledges
that a “poor” diet is responsible for many fatal illnesses in the EU, such as cancer, heart disease,
obesity, etc. But , considering “ that the diversity of food cultures throughout the European Union
constitutes a valuable asset that ought to be respected”, the Council foresees for the EU a role limited
to coordination and monitoring of nutrition policies that must be elaborated at the state level. In other
words, the principle of Subsidiarity must apply, which means that the EU should not have any power
of initiative on this food issue. The Commission is invited to allow for nutritional health to be taken
into account when drawing up and implementing any relevant Community policies, to develop tools to
monitor nutritional health and its determinants, to support research into the links between health and
nutrition, and last but not least to develop the use of nutritional labelling, by adapting it to the needs of
consumers.
The European Parliament does not have any clear view on an EU nutrition policy, but rather an
opportunistic one. For instance, the EP firmly opposed that nutrition should be in the remit of the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) committees. The main argument was that for the public,
Safety is a clear mission of the EFSA, while Nutrition would blur that signal: “I would ask the
Commission and the Council to listen to this united voice and to adopt 'European Food Safety
Authority' as the title of the institution. Keeping the word 'safety' in the title of the authority will give a
clear signal to consumers as to its purpose and goals54”. Behind this is the idea that nutrition is too
controversial to be clearly understood by consumers. It should be noted that at the EU level, consumer
organisations do not follow the EP line on this point.
The result is an institutional and regulatory division between a nutrition policy oriented towards public
health, addressed to citizens; and a nutrition policy oriented towards consumption and addressed to
consumers.
                                                
53 Council Resolution of 14 December 2000 on health and nutrition(2001/C 20/01)
54 Avril Doyle (EPP-ED, Ireland), Report amending the Commission proposal under the co-decision procedure
(1st reading) on the directive laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the
European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food, July 2000.
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6.1.1 Institutional division
DG SANCO
CONSUMPTION
PROTECTION
(Unit D,E,F,G)
HEALTH  PROMOTION
(Unit C)
      Remit - Animal and Plant Health Food
Control and Safety
from Farm to Fork
- Consumer information (Labelling
regulations)
- Public Health
Budget in 2001 - €564.5 Million :
(€21, 2  M for consumer policy;
€564,5 M for Animal and Plant
Health )
-€54.5 Million
Location Brussels Luxembourg
Figure 5 : Remit and budget , source EUROPA website
It is noticeable in this table that in 2001 the consumer policy budget55 equals almost half the overall
budget on public health.
6.1.2 Regulatory division
6.1.2.1 a- Nutrition and Health promotion
DG SANCO established in April 2002 an “ad hoc group on nutrition” under the “Inter Service Group
on Health”  staffed from various policy areas within the Commission, in order to identify actions to be
undertaken in the field of nutrition. One of its mandate includes the exchange of relevant information,
discussion on the measures needed to develop nutrition policy, and the identification of common
actions to be undertaken across policy areas (Status Report on the EC’s work on Nutrition, 2002). The
work plan for 2004 for the implementation of the programme of Community action in the field of
public health (2003 to 2008), “proposes to developing work to identify best practice and to take
forward coherent strategies on nutrition and physical activity in the Community, which should provide
recommendations and support to Member States. Emphasis will be on innovative measures and
approaches to improve dietary habits, excess weight and obesity, and physical activity habits in all
population” How this can be effectively achieved? This point is not developed. Another important
action of the Commission for nutrition as public health is to ensure that public health determinants are
taken into account in the other Community policies. According to my interviewees at DG SANCO
                                                
55 EU Financial report 2001,  Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002
also available on Europa website
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/execution/execution/financialreport01/rapfin_en.pdf), p82-83
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(Unit C - Health promotion), “Health” being not recognised as a Community prerogative, the
possibility of action is rather poor for this small unit based in Luxembourg far from the active Brussels
centre.  Community policies such as the Common Agriculture Policy, common fisheries policy,
Internal market policy , pillars of the EU single market are, not always compatible with public health
recommendations, and the standing committees in these areas representing member states tend to
reject health considerations, invoking the principle of Subsidiarity.
As put by one interviewee with responsibilities at unit C of SANCO:
“Health is not a Community attribution56. Art 152 defines what the Community must do in the
health domain, or rather it says what it should not do. Article says clearly that health is a
competency of member states and that the domain of activity of the Community is simply to
control there is no drift in the other policies that could be harmful to health57.”
The role of the Division of Health Promotion is limited to that of advisor in the wording of food
campaigns within the Member States. During the interview, acknowledging some pressures from the
member states, one civil servant explained:
“anyway, we are hidden behind agriculture (DG AGRI). Sometimes we are called out by
member states who tell us : you can not do that! But it is marginal. We are hidden in interface
behind agriculture which pass contracts and give final agreements58”
In a European Parliament document, another responsible in the former DG V shows some awareness
of the minimal room for manoeuvre they have in their attribution:
“(..) the public health mandate of the European Union is relatively new. Not only is it limited to
prevention of diseases and promotion of health, it also excludes health care.  It's also limited by
those actions that can only be done better at European Union level than at a national level, and
is rather limited in economic and financial terms”59.
A “cultural” irreducibility of nutrition habits would justify why no EU public nutrition policy has not
been yet possible: “Health, it’s to big, it’s too complicated, it’s demanding.. it’s too much linked to the
culture, there’s too many differences from one State to another”. But the main argument is that the
CAP needs compromise: “it’s like you see a train running, you cannot oblige it to change 90° just like
that, time is needed, but we think about it”60.
                                                
56 Interview performed in French : « La santé n'est pas une attribution communautaire »
57 « L'article 152 définit ce que fait la communauté dans le domaine de la santé, ou plutôt il dit ce qu'il doit pas
faire dans le sens que l'article dit clairement que la santé est une compétence des états membres et que le
domaine d'activité de la communauté est simplement de contrôler qu'il n'y a pas de dérives dans les autres
politiques qui puissent nuire à la santé” (M. D, DG SANCO Unit C, interview April 2003)
58 “De toute façon, on est caché derrière l'agriculture. Quelque fois on est interpellé par les Etats membres qui
nous disent vous pouvez pas faire quelque chose comme çà! Mais c'est marginal. On est caché en interface
derrière l'agriculture qui passe les contrats et donne l'accord final.” ” (M. D, responsible at DG SANCO unit C ,
interview April 2003)
59 Mr Jan Ole GUDMUNDSEN, DG V (Health promotion) Minutes of the joint meeting of the Health Forum
Intergroup and the Food and Health Intergroup held on Wednesday 16th September 1998 in, European
Parliament, Strasbourg, on the subject of Nutrition, Food Policy and Public Health in the EU
60 M. D, responsible at DG SANCO unit C , interview April 2003
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Commissioner Byrne, head of SANCO, asks for strengthening of Article 152 to include the
harmonisation of regulations in specific areas in order to leave decisions taken by the courts: “These
decisions should be made through an accountable, legislative process”61.
6.1.2.2 b - Consumption protection: nutrition issues and labelling regulations
The other remit of the EU institutions on nutrition, as programmed in the WP, is to produce
regulations on information and labelling of foodstuffs. If the nutrition and public health activities are
“hidden” in Luxembourg, the regulation of nutritional labelling is an activity well developed and well
supported by the Community.
“Labelling People in Brussels”62 - as called by our interviewee in DG Luxembourg to designate his
colleagues in the SANCO unit working on nutritional and functional claims -have been working on
claims63 issues closely with the stakeholders, consumer organisations and NGOs, for more than three
years. Positioned by Commissioner Byrne as “high priority”64, the Commission proposals on
nutritional and functional claims have been widely advertised and benefited from important visibility.
These two approaches reflect two coexistent models in nutrition regulation/policy; the more powerful
(in terms of economic, symbolic and network resources) is the model that addresses the consumer as
shopper/buyer, the other still marginalised is addressed to the public consumer (as citizen). We
schematise this in the following table as a point of departure for future analysis, and comparison with
TIF country reports:
                                                
61 As reported in Health Forum Intergroup. Meeting of the  Public Health Working Party 29th January 2003,
European Parliament, Brussels, “The future of public health in Europe” (minutes).Doc EPHA.
62 Les “gens de l’étiquetage”à Bruxelles
63 The WP on Food Safety justifies the necessity of a EU regulation on nutrition labelling in terms of Food
Safety (avoidance of specific adverse health effects), Consumer interests (must not mislead), and nutrition for
specific needs:  food supplements (i.e. concentrated sources of nutrients such as vitamins and minerals) and
fortified foods(i.e. and foods to which nutrients have been added).
64 SPEECH/03/87 David BYRNE European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection Health,
Nutrition and Labelling Address to the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection Committee of the
European Parliament Brussels, 19 February 2003
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CONSUMER ORIENTED model CITIZEN ORIENTED Model
- individual choice,
- consumer,
- individual risk,
- individual responsibilities
- consumer arbitrage between personal
cost/benefit
- actors/agencies involved : stakeholder and
consumer associations
- collective health,
- citizen,
- public burden, costs
- public responsibilities,
- public arbitrage between
majority/minority
- actors/agencies involved : NGOs health,
environment, agriculture no stakeholders,
weak participation of consumers
- solutions : labelling, claims
- information leads to education
- food standards
- solutions : dietary guidelines, CAP
reform
- education leads to understand
information
- action on public catering
- main criticisms on this model : vested
interests,  blur barriers between
food/medicine, education/information,
social inequality, systematic packaging,
- defensive strategy : involve scientists,
vulgarisation of scientific knowledge ,
information battle for a well informed
consumer
- main criticisms on  this model : do not
respect diversities, no scientific
consensus, no trust and no consumer
choice, heavy, bureaucratic,
- defensive strategy against criticisms:
involvement scientists, NGOs with wide
environmental, agriculture concerns,
studies, statistics, information
The division between “consumption protection” and “health promotion” is also reflected by the
existence of two types of lobby-players.
EPHA (secretariat for the Health Inter-group of the European Parliament) is an umbrella structure of
non profit organisations, funded by the Commission, that deals with nutrition as a public health issue.
EUFIC is a structure subsidised by important food and beverage industries. Put simply, while the first
is a structure well established with experienced staff and convinced that there is a need for an EU
public health policy including nutrition to limit the effect of the trend toward globalisation of
economies, the second, newly installed in Brussels aim to provide simple messages on nutrition to
press and media, targeting the public. The latter was born from the idea that consumers were ill
informed because of misinterpretation of the nutritional information by intermediate such as media or
politics and that there was a need for a direct canal of information from expert to consumer. “EUFIC
acts as a vital link in the communication chain by channelling information gathered at the source -
primarily from nutrition and food safety experts - through to the consumers65”. Since the White paper
and the priority given on the regulation of health claims, EPHA has turned on the debate on claims,
while the CAP and its possible consequences on food supply and demand is left out. Both EUFIC and
EPHA are in position to lobby the consumer protection unit which deal with labelling and claims
questions at DG SANCO Brussels, but they seem to have no direct contacts with the Luxembourg unit.
Although some positions still exist in member countries such as the interdiction of claims, nobody at
the EU level represents this opinion.
                                                
65 EUFIC, Who are we ?. http://www.eufic.org/gb/what/what.htm
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Both EPHA and EUFIC seem to be more or less formally the consumer representative-interlocutors of
the Commission and Parliament regarding nutrition issues in place of consumer organisations which
have no specific knowledge to share.  EUFIC does not claim to represent consumers, and has no
official representation near the Commission, but this small organisation based in the European quarter
of Brussels is made visible by a very good use of the Internet and the well supported communication
skills of its responsible to provide analysis from the last surveys undertaken by the food industries on
consumer behaviour, commented by scientists. EPHA who is a formal interlocutor of the Commission
positions, and a formal structure in the European Parliament constructs its discourses related to food
and nutrition, in the name of “consumers”. Ill-equipped, the consumer organisations can not compete
with them on the issues related to Nutrition. They do not have the communication power of the food
industry neither the necessary knowledge that is needed to produce a coherent discourse in the very
controversial and emotional discourses on nutrition.
6.2 Quality: a CAP reform discourse
There is no unique official definition of ‘Quality’ and ‘Quality Policy’ validated by the European
Institutions. Quality has a multidimensional meaning. It includes several aspects that can be put in a
hierarchical range. The Commission distinguishes between “non-negotiable” and “relative” or
“optional” aspects of quality66. This can be schematised as follows:
SAFETY
NUTRITION
INTRISIC QUALITY
(flavour , smell,
appearance)
ENVIRONMENT
ANIMAL WELFARE
ORGANIC
GI's
added value
optional
relative
must
Quality
differentiation
Figure 6 : Schematisation of the DG Agriculture definition of “quality”
                                                
66 Franz FISCHLER, Quality matters A new focus for agricultural policy, CIAA - European Food Summit 2002
Brussels, 12 April 2002,Press release SPEECH/02/149, or Quality webpage presented on DG Agriculture
website http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/foodqual/quali_en.htm
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This definition67 has a level of generality that is too high for it to be of use here. It is a socially
constructed and contested notion in the EU institutions as well. Another way to understand the recent
emphasis of quality in EU food policy is to explore how the expression is used in the official
Commission document, speeches and regulations and for what purposes during the last decade. We
particularly paid attention to these discourses in relation to the consumer.
6.2.1 EU discourse on quality
When announcing the new harmonisation method in the perspective of the achievement of the single
market, the Commission committed itself to no longer put forward proposals for the harmonization of
quality specifications which were not related to the protection of public health. Instead, the
Commission proposed to encourage industries to develop their own quality policies based on the use
of voluntary instruments. One decade later, in 2000, the term “quality” reappears in Commission
proposals, in numerous speeches and is object of an unprecedented campaign of communication.
In the public and official version, as it appears in the Commission website (2003), and in the interview
or speeches of members of the Commission, the EU policy to promote food products is almost entirely
included in three key-regulations on PDO-PGI, CSC and organic production all issued in 199268.
However, when examining the justifications given in these regulations, the expression “Quality” was
not particularly emphasised. These regulations were proposed and adopted first of all for economical
reasons (better balance between supply and demand; and for the rural economy), and only in fourth
place as a response to consumer demand for food quality69. What we would like to show now is that
the structural reorganisation that occurred after the BSE crisis and the preparation of the Common
Agricultural Policy Mid Term Review (MTR, known also as the CAP 2000 reform) are responsible for
a shift, if not towards a quality policy as a whole, but at least towards an EU discourse on quality
addressed to consumer-citizens. After investigation of all the documents published in the Commission
discourses (DG AGRI, DG SANCO) and in which the word quality was used, we made the three
following observations:
1- The structural reorganisation in 1997 resulted in the creation of DG SANCO responsible for
all matters of food except the application of the regulations on geographic appellation and
organic production, which lay with DG AGRI. We will not detail here this reorganisation
which has been many times described70.  But it places “quality” responsibilities outside of
SANCO and under the sole responsibility of DG AGRI.
2- The EU discourse on quality built and promoted from 2000 is found when the reorganisation
of the food-production chain, and in particular the agricultural sector, is at stake. In 2000 and
2001 a major part of the speeches of Franz Fischler, the Commissioner of DG Agriculture,
                                                
67 published in the DG AGRI website http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/foodqual/quali_en.htm)
68 designation of origin and geographical indication (regulation 2081/92/EEC), ‘specific character’ (regulation
2082/92/EEC); on organic production of agricultural products (regulation 2092/91/EEC)
69 Extracts from Council Regulation (EEC)No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 208, 24.7.1992, 1)
70 Green paper : The general principles of food law in the European Union COM(97) 176 final , notably
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published on the Europa website had a special focus on “quality”71 to explain the MTR to
stakeholders and European citizens. “a shift to the second pillar, says Franz Fischler, is a shift
to more quality”72.
3- “Food quality” in almost all the documents examined does not include “safety”. Rather they
are clearly differentiated by the systematic use of the expression “food safety and quality”. In
the documents “quality” implies a subjective judgement from the final consumer, Thus
“quality” is the result of different processes, packaging, labelling for equivalent products
which depend on the creativity of the producers and processors, “quality” aims to segment the
market, to allow a differentiation between competitors for the satisfaction of the final
consumer. For all these reasons, and unlike safety neither subjective, nor a differentiator, the
management of quality must be left to private initiative. The discourse on “quality promotion”
developed recently by the EU challenges the view that the main instrument of agriculture
regulation coming from Brussels, i.e. the “CAP” has tended to harmonise and standardise EU
agricultural production. In the MTR (Mid-Term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy) ,
the “Consumer demand for quality products” has been introduced to develop the vision of a
more integrated vertical chain from farm to fork, aiming to satisfy the buyer and not to
subsidise intensive agriculture. Quality being a matter of private initiative, the EU considers
its role as one of reward and consumer protection73. In order to protect consumer interests, the
EU seeks to promote “stringent quality management” by the adoption of international norms
in Quality Assurance schemes such as “contract farming” to give a guarantee to the consumer
that the products fulfil clearly defined quality standards. There is also another “liberal”
justification for distinction between Safety and Quality. Safety is a domain which necessitated
public intervention because poison threats, epidemic, environmental pollutions and all types of
unpredictable events can affect the “smooth” functioning of the market. Quality is a domain
where unexpected events that can decrease the quality of the product is solved by the market
itself but does not lead to any failure. In general, private actors are responsible and
accountable for the quality of their products.
The main EU “Quality” Regulations
(a) designation of origin (regulation 2081/92/EEC): means the name of a region, a specific
place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to describe an agricultural product or a
foodstuff:
— originating in that region, specific place or country, and
— the quality or characteristics of which are essentially or exclusively due to a particular
geographical environment with its inherent natural and human factors, and the production,
processing and preparation of which take place in the defined geographical area;
                                                
71 Several consultation and chat have been organised by DG AGRI in collaboration with SANCO to promote the
“quality” of food that are published in DG AGRI website.
72 Speech Franz Fischler Quality matters A new focus for agricultural policy CIAA - European Food Summit
2002 Brussels, 12 April 2002
73 “: “We, the policy makers, (…) want to create a framework which rewards the production of quality. However,
we should not forget that it is the consumer who decides what he or she considers high quality. And it is the
private sector, the farmers together with the food industry, which has to provide this quality. “ Speech  Franz
Fischler ‘Quality matters A new focus for agricultural policy CIAA’ - European Food Summit 2002 Brussels, 12
April 2002
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(b) geographical indication (regulation 2081/92/EEC): means the name of a region, a
specific
place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to describe an agricultural product or a
foodstuff:
— originating in that region, specific place or country, and
— which possesses a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to that
geographical origin and the production and/or processing and/or preparation of which take
place in the defined geographical area
(c) ‘specific character’ (regulation 2082/92/EEC) means the feature or set of features
which distinguishes an agricultural product or a foodstuff clearly from other similar products
or foodstuffs belonging to the same category.
(source: EUROPA website)
6.2.2 Discourse on quality in relation to consumer
The MTR proposition about Community subsidies shifting from “producer-support” to “production-
support” has been perceived negatively by farmers. The discourse on quality developed by the
Commission can be related to the willingness of the Commission to redefine what in the work of
farmer should be controlled by the market and what should be supported by the tax payer.  It is
remarkable that the Commission tends to present the Agriculture sector as outside of the rest of
society: “Agriculture is having to face changes in what society expects of it” said Commissioner
Fischler in an Agriculture Council meeting74. The EU discourse on quality introduces the continuous
link between “farmer” and “consumer” that still lacks the ideal image of the “farm to fork” promoted
by the EU. The purpose is not to define a quality policy neither an attempt to define what is consumer
understanding of quality. “Consumer demand for quality products” is a meaningless truth, with such a
high degree of generality that it justifies in itself the conformation of the farmer to a new role in
society.
“We want farmers to resume their role as businessmen, producing for their customers rather
than for the intervention stocks.”75
“At the same time, however, we also want to cut direct income payments to farmers who fail to
comply with the requirement on the environment, food safety and animal welfare76”
“This approach will mean farmers no longer have to present themselves as a charity case -
instead, as commercially-minded businessmen working for a healthier environment and
countryside, they can request their due from the European taxpayer with heads held high”77.
                                                
74 Franz Fischler Member of the European Commission responsible for Agriculture, ‘Rural Development and
Fisheries Food quality Informal Agriculture’,  Council meeting in Sweden Östersund, 10 April 2001
75 Speech Franz Fischler Member of the European Commission, responsible for Agriculture, Rural Development
and Fisheries Adjusting the CAP to better meet its objectives The European Policy Centre Brussels, 20
September 2002
76 ibid
77 ibid
TRUSTINFOOD                                 Institutional Report: EU                                   Bergeaud-Blackler
40
Consequently the links between Farmers and Consumers are of two types:
Unlike the consumer, the citizen is concerned with his right to choose according to other criteria than
those of consumers as a buyer. This conception certainly dates back the principle of the farm to fork
approach, although Commissioner Fischler acknowledges that both these faces of the consumer are not
always easy to reconcile78. The discourse on Quality is “Consumer driven”. Consumer demand for
quality is not just related to the intrinsic quality of the products or to the process of production but
more generally to “how it is produced”. This can include the environment, animal welfare or ethical
principles. In the debate on GMOs, for example, the latest regulation on GMO labelling recognises the
right of the consumer to refuse food produced by a process using genetic modification even if they do
not contain GMOs. As we saw in the debate on beef labelling, the institutionalised “EU consumer” has
a moral power over the agro-producer. We observed during our survey in Brussels that the two
agriculture representative organisations we interviewed (COPA-COGECA and CPE) had the least
elaborated image of the consumer. Both interviews described a conflictual relationship between
consumers and farmers, where farmers are victims of consumers manipulated by misleading messages.
One of the important challenges of the CAP reform following agenda 2000 was to enhance citizen and
consumer comprehension and acceptability of the CAP 79. Discourse on “quality” seems to have been
developed for this aim, partially by a re-reading of the objectives of important regulations such as Beef
labelling, PDO, PGI, or organic production which are now presented as consumer driven, while they
were built in the aftermath of the achievement of the single market for economical reasons and under
the pressure of some member states. The brochure published in 2001 by DG AGRI entitled “The
common Agriculture Policy, 2000 review”,80 reassembles all these regulations under the title “Putting
Consumers First”. Is this afterthought really able to reach its aim of citizen acceptability? One may
doubt it. Such manipulations sometimes lead to meaningless and frustrating sentences such as “The
new CAP will be geared towards consumers and taxpayers, while giving EU farmers the freedom to
produce what the market wants(sic)”; which may not enhance consumer trust81.
                                                
78 Speech by Franz Fischler ,  ‘the new challenge of the Common Agricultural Policy Public Hearing of the
European Parliament’, Brussels, 21 June 2001
79 Reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP), SCADPLUS,
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60002.htm
80 EU Publication: ISBN 92-894-1633-5
81 “CAP reform - a long-term perspective for sustainable agriculture
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/capreform/index_en.htm
(Business)
(Community support)
CONSUMER  (buyer)
CITIZEN (tax-payer)
FARMER
TRUSTINFOOD                                 Institutional Report: EU                                   Bergeaud-Blackler
41
6.3 Safety and consumer confidence
Food safety is the domain where the effective institutional and regulatory changes have been
determining all EU food policy. It is the domain where the institutionalisation of the consumer as
citizen does not compete anymore with the consumer as buyer, at least in the discourse.
One important pillar of the new EU food policy is the Food authority that all the institutions finally
agreed to devote entirely to Food Safety (the “S” of  EFSA).  The commitment of the EU to guarantee
to consumers the provision of safe food is visible through the majority of the 80 measures proposed in
the White Paper to ensure the best control of the food chain from the “farm to the fork”. All these
measures were planned or undertaken to protect consumers and to give them better guarantees that
foods circulating in the European market has been properly controlled. Giving this assurance was one
task of the new food policy agenda.
The other main task was to “restore” consumer confidence. Structural reform, enhancement of hygiene
control, new divisions of responsibilities or new principles of liability would maybe reduce the
proportion of poisonous food in the EU from an already infinitesimal amount but would not stop the
spiral of mistrust that affected the beef market, and its possible spread into other markets. The
treatment of consumer mistrust needed another “medicine” than that employed in guaranteeing the
production of safe food to protect consumer health.
Transparency is the key principle addressed to consumer mistrust. An “agencification”82 of food safety
has been chosen to address the problem of mistrust83, accompanied by a risk analysis policy advised
by WHO/FAO 84 and based on a distinction between “risk assessment”, “risk management” and “risk
communication”. As imagined by Commissioner Santer, the European “agency” should have been a
European adapted version of the FDA. But the choice was finally made later by the Prodi Commission
to strictly separate management from assessment missions and to give to the European “authority” the
risk assessment function and the coordination of member country food agencies (Buonanno, 2003).
The European Food Safety Authority was established in 2002 by the European Parliament and Council
co-decision85.
High expectations have been established in most of the observers, and the EFSA has been set up
consensually and without major criticism on its principles. But within one year, strong criticisms
affected the credibility of the institution even before its start. This was the fact that the particular remit
of the EFSA is “safety”. This emphasis on food safety in the new EU agenda to restore consumer trust
has been criticised because it hampers the development of other health related policies such as
nutrition (Millstone et al. 2000). The limits between risk assessment and risk management have been
ill-defined (Vos, 1999).
                                                
82 Agencification definition.
83 This solution was proposed in the conclusion of the Pascal, Kemper James report (1999) ordered by the Prodi
Commission. For theoretical examination of the  issue of agencification / delegation see Majone, 1996:40
84 Application of Risk Analysis to Food Standard Issues - Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation,
13-17 March 1995
85 “The primary responsibility” of the EFSA is “to provide independent scientific advice on all matters with a
direct or indirect impact on food safety”. European Parliament and Council “Regulation laying down the general
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down
procedures in matters of food safety”, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 21 January 2002
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An officer in DG SANCO responsible for the relation with EFSA that we interviewed in 2003, one
year after its creation, was still not sure how they would manage their relation with them in practical
terms86.
Consumer organisations such as BEUC criticised the way the EFSA management board was
composed : “they have packed the board with officials, mostly working under the direction of national
governments” (B.K., BEUC October 2002). The result was not favourable to consumer organisations
since only one in four of those proposed is a consumer organisation representative. The European
Parliament adopted half the promised sum to the EFSA budget, delaying its start. The member states
have not reached a consensus on finding a site for the EFSA, which still temporary located in Brussels.
Finally, the specialised  press states:
“It is, in fact, difficult to believe that the Parliament, after all the same body that cleared the
legislation paving the way for Europe’s new food safety body, finds it appropriate to cut the
budget by half – in addition, the EFSA is still very much at the developmental stage. What
happened to prioritising food safety in Europe?”.
The fact these criticisms do not have any particular impact in the political press does not show that the
targeted “consumer” does not matter, but maybe conversely that the Authority has not acquired the
trust that was supposed to spread to EU food policy and is still ignored.
Nevertheless for an interviewee from DG SANCO, the creation of the EFSA and the separation of risk
assessment from management is a shift of responsibilities because the Commission will be better
protected from political pressure:
“with the new system, we’ll be able to answer, «listen you have requests, you may have political
commitments, but in terms of safety it’s nothing, the world won’t collapse if you don’t have it in
6 months», while there is opinion on which there is important and emergency stake for
consumer protection.”87
The creation of the EFSA introduces another management of priority between food safety issues
which may limit political pressures on DG SANCO.
These examples underlined that measures undertaken to restore “consumer trust” have been directly
criticised, notably through its more symbolic expression. But only systematic investigations on the
function of the EFSA in its relation with DG SANCO and the other EU institutions will be able to tell
how extensive this shift of responsibilities was. Such investigation is impossible for the moment as the
EFSA is not yet in full function.
                                                
86 Interview DG SANCO, May 2003
87 “ avec le nouveau système on va pouvoir leur répondre (aux pressions politiques), « »écoutez vous avez des
demandes , vous avez peut-être des engagements politiques, mais au niveau sanitaire ça sert strictement à rien,
le monde va pas s’écrouler si vous l’avez pas dans 6 mois », alors qu’il y a des avis sur lesquels il y a des vrais
enjeux importants, urgents de protection du consommateur » Interview  DG Sanco, May 2003
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6.4  Safety and division of responsibilities between private and public
Less visible, but probably also very influential, are the consequences of this food safety policy, that is
grounded on the protection of “consumer interests”, on the behaviour of market actors.
Since the 1990’s, the food regulatory systems in developed countries are facing new challenges
brought by new food-borne risks, the necessity to update control of established risks and political
pressure for increasing controls “as a mechanism to support consumer confidence in the safety of the
food supply”. In international trade, public food safety measures are also suspected to be non-tariff
barriers to trade under the SPS Agreement. For all these reasons the EU sought to favour private self
control systems. Directive 93/43 required food companies to implement Hazard Analysis Critical
Control Point ( HACCP) and a recent commission package foresees to make the application of
HACCP method compulsory for all non-primary food operators88. To make HACCP compulsory is
also to put primary responsibility for the safety of food on food producers.
As demonstrated in numerous studies, strategic responses to stringent food safety regulation have been
developed by market actors.: “public food safety regulation is becoming more performance and
process based, placing greater emphasis on the responsibility of food businesses to implement
effective food safety controls. In turn, food businesses are using food safety regulation strategically in
a bid to gain competitive advantage”. (Henson and Caswell,1999)
The question of the limitation of public safety regulation by private actors is also raised and, if not to
be concluded, deserves to be mentioned. As observed by Marsden, private strategies develop to limit
public initiative in the name of consumer interests.
“A private-interest model of food regulation has developed alongside the public local authority
enforcement system, such that retailers are now much more effective in controlling the quality
and direction of foods from ‘plough-to- plate.’ The rise of private-interest regulation does not,
however, avoid the need for the State to protect the consumer interest (as the BSE and the GM
controversy shows). What it does do is to limit the state’s ability to act in the consumer and
public interest. Moreover, the progressive privatisation of research and development associated
with food (expressed, for instance, in the proliferation of private patenting of genetic modifying
techniques) means that governments can no longer ‘command and control’ the food system on
behalf of consumers.” (Marsden)
In particular Flynn, Marsden and Smith observed a recent development of retailer-led food hygiene
and hazard systems (such as HACCP) emerged  “as a condition of market entry for food suppliers and
manufacturers: the retailers expect more and more from their suppliers in terms of the policing of food
delivery as well as the type and specifications of the food produced.” This allows retailers to gain a
market advantage with customers in terms of food safety and quality. Retailers promote their own
                                                
88 measure is a part of the “hygiene package” composed of four proposals. The first four are proposed legislative
acts: (I) general hygiene of foodstuffs, (II) hygiene of foodstuffs of animal origin, (III) official controls on
products of animal origin intended for human consumption, and (IV) animal health rules for products of animal
origin for human consumption. The aim is to harmonise and simplify the EU hygiene legislation that was
previously scattered over 17 separate Directives. Press release SANCO, Hygiene package: “Commissioner
David Byrne welcomes political agreement on animal health rules” DN: IP/02/1766     Date: 28/11/2002
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/02/1766|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display
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quality standards according to their own “hierarchy of quality definitions” (Flynn, Marsden, Smith,
2003).
6.5 EU food safety and external constraints
Let us turn to a more global regulatory level. The period we examine has also been marked by
important international events which affected food policies – most significantly amongst them being
the creation of the World Trade Organisation.  Agriculture lost its status of exception and food must
now be treated like other goods.
Up until 1995 GATT89 allowed countries to implement a number of non-tariff agricultural measures
(such as import quotas and export subsidies) which were not allowed for other products. Agriculture
products had a status of exemption in international trade, inherited from the need for national food
sufficiency after the Second World War. During the negotiation of the Uruguay Round (1986–94), it
was accepted by most countries that this situation resulted in significant distortion of the international
agricultural sector and blocked the potential development of international agricultural trade. The
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), which aimed at agricultural trade liberalisation,
was signed between WTO members officially “to strike a balance between this liberalization and
governments’ desire to pursue legitimate agricultural policy goals.” WTO Members committed to
reduce support and protection in the areas of market access, export subsidies, and domestic support.
In counterpart, notably under EU pressure, the countries engaged to address what was described as
“non-trade concerns”, vaguely defined around food security, protection of the environment and
developing countries’ protection of interests. Each country had their own interpretation of what they
considered to be non-trade concerns and this was an important breach in the liberalisation trend.
The members of WTO divided into two groups reflecting a durable internal conflict in the WTO: in
one group the “Friends of multifunctionality”, including the EU, who considered that farmers should
be remunerated not only for their production of marketable commodities, but also their non-
commodity outputs which have public good characteristics. In the other group, the opponents of
multifunctionality, principally the United States and the Cairns Group, saw the multifunctionality
argument as an attempt to resist trade liberalisation (Burrel,2002). Another more specific agreement
(the SPS agreement90) was signed for the same purpose: to encourage liberalisation and competition
by ruling on the use of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Officially, the SPS Agreement sought to
“reduce arbitrariness” of decisions by the application of two principles. Measures having effect to
restrict trade should be based on the analysis and assessment of “objective” and “accurate” scientific
data and governments should establish national sanitary and phytosanitary measures consistent with
international standards, guidelines and recommendations91. For foodstuffs, the Codex Alimentarius92
was recognised as a reference for international standards.
                                                
89 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was superseded by the WTO in 1995.
90 Agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures
91 The terms into quotation marks are taken from the official WTO website, www.wto.org
92The  Codex Alimentarius Commission is a subsidiary body of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
the World Health Organization (WHO) born in 1963 to develop food standards, guidelines and related texts such
as codes of practice. (http://www.codexalimentarius.net/)
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The SPS Agreement also made explicit the basis for challenges between countries. A country can
challenge another country on the grounds that there is not sufficient scientific evidence supporting the
trade restriction. The burden of proof is on the country taking the restriction measure rather than on the
country introducing in the international market the “suspected” product. In case of disputes, a new
WTO dispute settlement procedure can be invoked by the parties in conflict. In brief: after seeking
scientific advice (for food matters, from the Codex Alimentarius commission), if the dispute
settlement panel finds that a country is violating its obligations, it can oblige it either to conform or to
pay fines. The SPS agreement elevates scientific evidence to the position of being the determining
factor in disputes between members. In the EU, the scientific knowledge is also authoritative but  not
exclusive. The EU Scientific Committee for Food and other expert commissions must be consulted
whenever health aspects are concerned in a foodstuffs related regulation, but the Commission
“reserves the right to take other factors into consideration when reaching a final decision”(Hankin,
1997).
The dispute on hormone beef between member states, and later between the US and the EU, illustrates
a growing international pressure on the EU regulatory framework towards more liberalisation in the
foodstuffs sector and the difficulty for the EU of continuing to follow its “mediative” policy style
(Grace Skogstad, 2001) and to impose “other legitimate concerns”.
In 1985, the EC Council of Ministers voted to ban hormones in the Community. This decision was
taken after negotiations between the UK and Ireland opposed to a total ban, and France, Germany, the
Netherlands and Italy rejecting the use of any hormone. A few years later this decision was challenged
at the WTO by US on the grounds that the ban was not exclusively based on scientific evidence. In
1997, the US and Canada held formal consultations in front of the WTO dispute settlement body. The
two WTO panels in charge to assess the EC prohibition found that it was not in conformity with the
SPS Agreement93. The EC appealed the conclusions of the panels in September 1997. But the
Appellate Body, although cancelling two of the three conclusions of the panel, concluded that the EC
was wrong and should bring its measures into conformity with its obligations. The EU was warned to
implement the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s recommendation by May 1999. The EU failed to
meet the deadline and had to pay concessions for the US and for Canada (in the form of 100% ad
valorem duty on imports on a variety of EC products94). In response, the EC invested in several
scientific studies to prove the hazard of certain types of hormones in beef. Some studies concluded
positively, some not, but the results are irrelevant unless the Codex Commission validates them.
Despite this crisis between the EU and other countries in the WTO, the EU always, despite not
applying its rules, supported the SPS agreement. As shown by the Hormone in Beef conflict, the SPS
agreement was not in the line with the EC “mediative style” imposed by the plurality of the interests it
represents. Despite this, DGs Agriculture, Internal Market and Industry, and Trade officials signed this
Agreement. While consumer interests became an important issue in the EU, the Community
delegations to the WTO have never been able to raise these concerns.
                                                
93
94 “Hormones in bovine meat , background and History of WTO dispute”, DG SANCO, website
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As underlined by N.Perdikis et al. (2001), TBT95 and SPS96  agreements are inadequate to address
consumer concerns: “there is no mechanism to allow politicians to ignore their WTO commitments
when faced with the same type of political pressure from consumers that is expected from producers”.    
This discrepancy between the Community voices in the EU and outside the EU has been the target of
the groups which promote non-trade concerns: agriculture interest groups, consumer associations and
environmental NGOs, and also among academics, sociologists, economists and researchers in food
policy. For them, scientific-based policies are an effective booster for liberalisation of trade in
agriculture, but is not sufficient to guarantee health and environmental protection. Codex Alimentarius
was the first body to illustrate the absence of the independence of scientists. The connexion between
industry interests and scientists and the opaqueness of the scientific experts’ work in the Codex
Alimentarius commissions has been demonstrated in several works and reports (Longfield,(1992);
Avery et al.(1993); Millstone and van Zwanenberg, (2002)). The inability of the system to take into
account minority judgements amongst scientists is also denounced.  In brief, more and more in the EU
oppose an exclusively scientific-based policy and support the argument that risk management can not
be based only on scientific grounds but must be considered as “a social issue and ought to be decided
in an open and democratically accountable fashion.” (Millstone, Van Zwanenberg, 2002).
One can conclude that while in the EU “consumer interest” has in one decade become a major
concern, where food could no longer be treated as other market goods then, following a diametrically
opposite trend, the globalisation of trade exchange has led to the creation of the WTO which has ended
the period in which agricultural products were treated as special goods required for filling human
needs.
7 Conclusions
The TIF project considers trust in terms of social relations, which from a comparative viewpoint can
assume different institutional forms. Its aim is not directed towards the research of factors that
“enhance” consumer trust in food, but rather to understand variations in conditions for the production
and maintenance of consumer trust in food.
One part of the TIF project is to study the variation in individual’s beliefs and opinions through
questionnaires addressed to consumers. The other part, in which the present report  find its utility,
aims to describe which factors could be said to cause different types of ‘trust regimes’. Trust regime is
conceptualised as the combination or configuration of institutional relationships of trust between the
core agencies of a food system97. The institutional studies aim to first draw institutional mappings of
the food systems in the 6 countries and at the EU level, and secondly to study the main shift of
responsibilities in the 5 key food issued in relation to consumer. An important hypothesis is that
“degrees of separation between regulatory agencies and the food industry, systems of accountability
between different actors, and the distribution of social responsibility for risk between actors were
likely to be key aspects of variation between trust regimes” (ibid).
                                                
95 “Technical Barrier to Trade”
96 “Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary”
97 Towards a comparative institutional analysis of trust in food Mark Harvey & Alan Warde CRIC
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In this report we argued that the establishment of the SEM and the new harmonisation approach have
led to a decisive step towards a Europeanization of the member states food systems by forcing member
countries to find agreement on the limits that define food issues. Can this explain the institutional
reforms that happened in all the countries studied in the TIF project ?  Or are these reforms just
political responses to consumer distrust after food crisis? We argued here that both have equally
contributed to institutional changes.
One consequence of these two events is to have separate food safety issues from all other food issues,
in a somewhat questionable manner. The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement has
confirmed at the international level the power of member states to take sanitary and phytosanitary
measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life (i.e. refuse entry to its market of
suspected products). The interpretation of health tends to be at all levels reduced to safety. Worrying
statistics published regularly by the WHO on increasing obesity in Europe, and in particular amongst
children, may lead the member countries to give a mandate to the EC to initiate a public health policy
on nutrition. But the problem will then rise to the WTO level and the issue may become even more
complex to solve.
Since “the consumer” has been disembodied from “consumption”, it has appeared as the main
motivation of key regulations related to food safety, nutrition and food quality. The consumer appears
to be the ultimate goal of all food regulation. If we had studied the ability of the EU institutions and
stakeholders to communicate about risk, we would certainly conclude that since 1997 the conditions
have been met to enhance the level of consumer trust in food.  Regulatory agencies are well separated
from agro-food industries, the EU addressed the problem of accountability in its farm to fork approach
and the distribution of responsibility is made relatively clear by structural division by DG and unit.
However, in drawing the birth of the “EU consumer” (or the history of the institutionalisation of
consumer), it appeared that institutional re-arrangements have occurred around a fairly fragmented
conception of “consumer interest”. The strategy for solution of food problems largely depends on the
meaning given to ‘consumer interest’.
To build a rational representation of this “unmanageable consumer”98, the EU institutions and their
Brussels discussants (all type of lobby groups) dispose of three different sources that portray the
average “consumer”, its wants, desires, opinions, refusals etc.: the consumer organisations themselves
recently joined environmental NGOs, animal welfare groups, the Eurobarometers, and the information
related to consumer behaviour produced by the retailers and food industry. All produce very
contradictory information.
The complexity of the changing “consumer” led to the research of the maximisation of the satisfaction
of consumer by reinsuring his individual “right to choose”. Flexible and general solutions in favour of
reactive market actors are preferred. The labelling solution was one of them.
To give the right to choose is also put the consumer in position to make a decision, and therefore to be
responsible of his decision. In a context of growing complexity of food chain and growing asymmetry
                                                
98 Gabriel, Yiannis, Tim Lang (1995).
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of information between producers and consumers, the question raises if the consumer’s “right to
choose” is misleading.
Nutrition issues are treated by means of regulation of claims. Although nutrition problems are of
important consequence to public health, they are still treated at the individual level, the responsibility
lying on consumer choice. Nutrition being not considered as a collective safety problem (despite the
number of deaths from poor diet through cancer, obesity and cardio- vascular disease) the principle of
Subsidiarity and mutual recognition apply and the main initiative in the matter are left to the food
industries and retailers.
The consequence of the emphasis on food safety is that resistances to EU regulation tend to be
expressed in terms of “safety”. Safety regulations have been strategically used by private actors to gain
competitive advantage. In the WTO, the consumer’s voice does not exist, and this leads member
countries to use the SPS agreement. Instead of being seen as a means to express a state of social
acceptation of risk, all attempts to speak in the name of consumer are rather seen as a protectionist
strategy.
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